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Too Little, Too Late:
The Pace of Adjudication
of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights
ARIEL DULITZKY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Inter-American System for the protection of human rights
(“the System”) is formed principally by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (“the Commission” or “IACHR”) and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (“the Court” or “IACHR”) of the
Organization of American States (OAS).1 In its 50 years of functioning,
it has had important achievements in the promotion and defense of
human rights in the region. The System played an essential role when
*

Clinical Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law. I would like to thank
the students of the Human Rights Clinic who for two years worked the study that serves as the
basis of this article. Their dedication was and is an inspiration to me, see infra note 27. I also
would like to thank Lawrence Helfer, Daniel Brinks and Alexandra Huneeus; the participants of
the workshop Impacto y eficacia del sistema americano de derechos humanos: Perspectivas
empíricas y experiencias prácticas, June 22nd, 2011, Buenos Aires, Argentina; of the Panel:
Regional Human Rights System in Socio-Legal Perspective at the 2012 International Conference
on Law and Society, Honolulu, Hawai’i, June 5–8, 2012 and of the Rapoport Center for Human
Rights and Justice Summer Fellows Workshop at the University of Texas School of Law, August
8, 2012, for their comments, reflections, and critiques of the original ideas and preliminary
versions of this article. I would like to thank the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
and its Secretariat for having read a preliminary version of the study that serves as the basis for
this article, for having received the Human Rights Clinic to present the report and for having
provided us with invaluable information. Particular thanks to Santiago Canton and Elizabeth AbiMershed. As always my conversations with Denise Gilman help to sharpen my ideas. Of course,
all errors are my exclusive responsibility.
1. See SCOTT DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 8 (1997). In
reality, when speaking of the Inter-American human rights system, one should think more broadly
than the Commission and Court. As this article will show, there are very relevant actors that
influence the System and its pace of adjudication including (disaggregated) Statesindividually
and collectivelythe OAS, its Secretary General, human rights organizations and the victims of
human rights abuses. See also Ariel Dulitzky, The Inter-American Human Rights System Fifty
Years Later: Time For Changes, Special Edition, REVUE QUÉBÉCOISE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 127, 128 (2011) [hereinafter Dulitzky, Fifty Years]. For the idea of a
disaggregated State or multiple autonomous State actors and their relationship with the InterAmerican human rights system and its implications for compliance. See Alexandra Huneeus,
Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons From The Inter-American Court’s Struggle To Enforce Human
Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493 (2011).
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authoritarian regimes were the rule in the hemisphere. It denounced and
condemned the massive and systematic human rights violations that
took place then.2 The System contributed to a broader awakening of
civil society in its fight against the military rulers. At the same time, the
System helped the return or establishment of democracy in many
countries.3 The 1980 report by the Commission on human rights in
Argentina4 is the paradigmatic example of the work of the System
during those dark years in the region.5
During the last twenty or thirty years, Latin America experienced a
turn from military dictatorships and civil wars toward free elections.6 A
simple reflection on the situation in 1978, the year when the American
Convention on Human Rights7 (“American Convention” or
“Convention”) entered into force, is a good example. There were civil
wars or military governments in Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina,
Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Guatemala, Panama and Haiti.8 Colombia was living in a situation of
widespread violence caused by the army, guerrilla and drug trafficking
groups.9 Venezuela suffered from periodic attempts of coups d’etat. In
those years, there were gross and massive violations of human rights in
Mexico.10 Forced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, death
squads, clandestine detention camps, tortures, and rapes were
commonplace.11

2. See CECILIA MEDINA QUIROGA, THE BATTLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GROSS, SYSTEMATIC
VIOLATIONS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, (1988).
3. Antonio Cançado Trindade, El Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos
Humanos (1948–1995): Estado Actual y Perspectivas, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL Y DERECHOS
HUMANOS, (ed. By Bardonnet and Cançado Trindade) (1996).
4. INFORME SOBRE LA SITUACIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN ARGENTINA (1980),
OEA/SerL/V/II.49 Doc 19 (Apr. 11, 1980) [Arg.]. Lewis H. Diuguid, OAS Rights Group Accuses
Argentina Of Torture and of Killing Thousands, THE WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 20, 1980, § 1, at
A18.
5. See David Weissbrodt & Maria Luisa Bartolomei, The Effectiveness of International
Human Rights Pressures: The Case of Argentina, 1976–1983, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1010 (1991).
6. Id.
7. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention].
8. See Brian E. Loveman, Military Government in Latin America 1959−1990, THE
OXFORD
BIBLIOGRAPHIES
(Nov.
11,
2012,
11:50
AM),
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766581/obo-97801997665810015.xml;jsessionid=EE98FB770E701890EBE4D4732A682CD5?print.
9. Ricardo Vargas, The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit
Drug Trade (June 7, 1999) available at http://www.tni.org/briefing/revolutionary-armed-forcescolombia-farc-and-illicit-drug-trade.
10. See AMNESTY INT’L, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 150–53, available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL10/003/1980/en/4eaa8da9-d3b3-46f4-b4298cf536834e07/POL100031980eng.pdf.
11. Id.
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Today, the reality has changed dramatically. The only country in
the Hemisphere where there are no free elections is Cuba. There are no
civil wars in Central America. In 2000, for the first time in modern
Mexican history, the opposition won the Presidency.12 Nevertheless,
widespread police violence, organized crime, corruption, intimidation
and lack of independence of judges and courts, discrimination against
indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants, undue restriction of freedom
of expression and violence against journalists, human rights defenders
and social actors, violence and discrimination against women, impunity
for human rights abuses are still present throughout the region.13 Social,
economic and cultural rights are far from being a reality for vast sectors
of the population in the Hemisphere.14
The expectation that, in this changed context, the number of
complaints filed with the IACHR would diminish has proven to be
wrong.15 In fact, as civil society flourished in Latin America and the
System became better known, the number and complexity of petitions
filed with the Commission has steadily grown.16 With limited resources
allocated by the OAS, this situation has resulted in a “considerable
workload for the IACHR, which affects the prompt and efficient
processing of cases, particularly in terms of the backlog of cases,
procedural delays, and repetition of the acts . . . in proceedings.”17 The
Commission has introduced various reforms to its internal practices and
Rules of Procedure (“Rules”) to deal with the new influx of complaints.
But still, there is a growing backlog and the length of adjudication has
reached an unacceptable point.

12. MATTHEW C. GUTMANN, THE ROMANCE OF DEMOCRACY: COMPLAINT DEFIANCE IN
CONTEMPORARY
MEXICO
10
(2002),
available
at
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=lfxRL3W764cC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=mexico+
election+2000&ots=avnvKQ0Gxk&sig=K4A9YiMTUaUqLqKMrbZHRkHyWkQ#v=onepage&
q=mexico%20election%202000&f=false.
13. See AMNESTY INT’L, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 234–38, available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/annual-report/2012/americas.
14. Id.
15. Nancy Thede and Hugues Brisson, International Relations and the Inter-American
System of Human Rights promotion and protection. Strategic exploitation of windows of
opportunity. Special Edition, REVUE QUÉBÉCOISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 7, 19 (2011); See
also OAS, Permanent Counsel, Report of the Special Working Group to Reflect on the Workings
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with a view to Strengthening the InterAmerican Human Rights System for consideration by the Permanent Council, 11,
GT/SIDH/13/11/rev. 2 [hereinafter OAS Working Group] (stating that “in recent years the
number of cases and petitions processed by the IACHR had progressively escalated as a result of
progress in the consolidation of democracy in the Hemisphere and increased participation and
awareness among users of the [system]”).
16. OAS Working Group, supra note 15, at 11.
17. Id.
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Although some progress has been made, States and petitioners
experience long wait times before receiving a decision from the
Commission on the merits of a case. For example, in the Isaza Uribe
case, the Commission adopted an admissibility report more than 20
years after receiving the petition.18 Though the Commission originally
requested information from the State both on admissibility and merits, it
decided only on the admissibility issues. From November 1991 to
August 1995 and then from August 1998 to November 2009, there was
no procedural activity.19 In its admissibility report, the Commission
considered that twenty-three years of criminal investigation constituted
undue delay, despite the fact that it took the IACHR twenty-one years to
arrive at that conclusion.20 The Commission noted that the State did not
justify or explain the period of time that passed without procedural
activity.21 Nevertheless, the Commission did not provide any
justification for its own inactivity. As Helfer stated in reference to the
European Court of Human Rights (“European Court”), it is ironic that
sometimes a human rights body takes longer to decide a case than the
maximum length of time the System allows for proceedings in national
courts.22
While the Izasa Uribe case is an extreme example, there is a
consensus that the Commission’s process is too slow and that the
Commission has historically struggled to deal with petitions in a timely
manner.23 This view is so unexceptional that there are very few
18. The petition was received in December 1990 and the admissibility report was adopted on
July 22, 2011. See Víctor Manuel Isaza Uribe And Family (Columbia), Admissibility Report,
Report No. 102/11, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Petition No. 10.737, (July 22, 2011).
19. Id. ¶¶ 5–6.
20. Id. ¶ 29.
21. Id.
22. Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness
as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 EJIL 125, 133 (2008).
The European system confronts a similar but much bigger backlog and delay problem.
23. Comm. on Int’l Human Rights, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: A
Promise Unfulfilled, 48 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 589, 602–04 (1993); INSTITUTO
LATIONAMERICANO DE SERCICIOS LEGALES ALTERNATIVOS (ILSA), SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO
PARA LA PROTECCION DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS. APORTES PARA UNA EVALUACION (1994) at
66−67; Dinah Shelton, Improving Human Rights Protections: Recommendations for Enhancing
the Effectiveness of the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
3 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 323, 330 (1988); HECTOR FAUNDEZ LEDESMA, EL SISTEMA
INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS, 507 (2004); Ariel Dulitzky, La
Duración Del Procedimiento Ante El Sistema Interamericano De Protección De Los Derechos
Humanos: Responsabilidades Compartidas, EL FUTURO DEL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE
PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS 365 (Juan E. Méndez & Francisco Cox eds., 1998);
Robert K. Goldman, History and Action: The Inter-American Human Rights System and the Role
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 856, 882−83 (2009),
available
at
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=facsch_lawr
ev.
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examinations on the length of the IACHR’s adjudication process and no
known integral quantitative or empirical studies on its pace of individual
petition processing.24 Most studies of the Commission highlight the
problems caused by the delays, the need to expedite cases and
recommendations on how to achieve that goal.25 But given that the pace
of adjudication is central to the efficiency and effectiveness of the work
of the Commission, it is crucial to understand the exact pace, how and
why delays occur, what the extent of the backlog is, and crucially, what
the proper policy framework is to understand and deal with such pace.26
This article explores these questions.
Much of the research and analysis included in this article relies
heavily on the results of a two-year study that I conducted with my
students enrolled in the Human Rights Clinic at the University of Texas
School of Law (“the Human Rights Clinic” or “the Clinic”).27 The
purpose of the study was to examine the IACHR’s length of procedure,
identify the causes of the delays, and make recommendations that could
improve the Commission’s efficiency. For that purpose, we created a
database chronicling the length of time of each step in the
Commission’s procedures for every adjudicated petition and case since
1996.28 We also compiled information on the length of time it took for
subsequent procedures for each case in the Inter-American Court.29 As a
result of our research, we produced a report entitled, “Maximizing
24. I know of only two studies, not exclusively empirical, written specifically on the length
of the procedure of the System. The first one is a short article that I wrote 15 years ago. See
Dulitzky, Duración, supra note 23. And the second, is a recent article, Federico Ramos, The Need
For An In-Time Response: The Challenge For The Inter-American Commission On Human
Rights For The Next Decade 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 159 (2011).
25. See also Alex Whiting, International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be
Justice Delivered, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 363 (2009) in the context of international criminal
law.
26. For a similar question in the context of international criminal justice, see Jean
Galbraith, The Pace of International Criminal Justice, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 79 (2009).
27. Under my supervision, Grace Beecroft, Priya Bhandari, Robert Brown, Stacy
Cammarano, Amy Fang, Nicholas Hughes, Nishi Kothari, and Monica Uribe participated in
different stages of the research and report writing process. Celina Van Dembroucke created the
first version of the database that was updated with the support of Carlos Mejias, Anne-Marie
Huff, Victoria Cruz, Melissa Brightwell, Anna Koob, and Katie Sobering. Ted Magee, the Clinic
Administrator, and Shailie Thakkar edited the final version of the report. As the Clinic’s Director
and former Assistant Executive Secretary of the Commission, I developed the research
methodology, supervised the work, reviewed the different drafts of the report, and was
responsible for the final version of the report.
28. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF TEXAS SCH. OF LAW, MAXIMIZING JUSTICE,
MINIMIZING DELAY: STREAMLINING PROCEDURES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
4
(2011),
available
at
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_Justice_Minimizing_Delay_at
_the_IACHR.pdf [hereinafter MAXIMIZING JUSTICE].
29. Id.
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Justice, Minimizing Delay: Streamlining Procedures of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights”30 (the “Report”), completed
in December 2011.31 This article, particularly sections IV-VI, borrows
extensively from the research and analysis, as well as some language, in
the Report.
The Report’s main findings are that overall, there is a large
backlog of cases, the Commission’s procedure is frontloaded, and
petitions and cases have long wait times.32 Despite noteworthy progress,
more petitions and cases are being added to the backlog every year.33
Further, the Report shows that the Commission makes considerably
more admissibility decisions than any other type of decision.34
This increased backlog has created long wait times for
petitioners.35 Using the database of publicly available reports, the Clinic
determined that it takes an average of six and a half years from the
initial submission of a petition to the final merits decision.36 Within that
time, it takes over four years just for a decision on admissibility.37 The
Clinic’s findings demonstrate that the average wait time for each type of
decision has increased progressively for the last fifteen years.38 Part of
the increase in the wait times could be attributed to the fact that the
Commission is currently dealing with a backlog of old petitions.39
The data suggests that the reforms to the Rules in 2000 and 2009,
as well as the reorganization of the Executive Secretariat in 2008, have
not reduced the length of time from the submission of petitions to their
final resolution.40 The Report concludes that the 2000 reforms dividing
the procedure into admissibility and merits is one of the main factors

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF TEXAS SCH. OF LAW, MAXIMIZING JUSTICE,
MINIMIZING DELAY: STREAMLINING PROCEDURES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
4
(2011),
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_Justice_Minimizing_Delay_at
_the_IACHR.pdf
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF TEXAS SCH. OF LAW, MAXIMIZING JUSTICE,
MINIMIZING DELAY: STREAMLINING PROCEDURES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
4
(2011),
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_Justice_Minimizing_Delay_at
_the_IACHR.pdf
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leading to the current backlog and delay,41 as it shifted the focus of the
Commission to the admissibility stage.42
This article, which borrows some sections from the writings of the
Clinic’s Report, begins with an overview of the Commission and its
multiple functions, including the adjudicatory ones. Next, the article
goes into the results of the empirical research to assess the growing
backlog and long procedural delays based on the database we created.
The following section considers some of the factors contributing to the
current situation. I continue with a critical description of the procedural,
administrative and technical measures adopted by the Commission in
the last decade. While there are several reforms that have had a positive
impact, the article also identifies well-intended reforms that have had
unintended negative consequences.43
The article then moves into a discussion on what makes a human
rights body effective and how the pursuit of efficacy could complement
or contradict the purpose of being an effective adjudicator
simultaneously. The article explains why a goal-based definition of
effectiveness is needed in order to both assess the performance of the
Commission and the possibilities and limitations of the measures that
the Commission could adopt to speed up its process, and to deal with its
current backlog. In order to do that, I explore the different goals that the
Commission pursues in its adjudicatory role. Based on this analysis, the
article presents several recommendations—some already included in the
Report—including both internal reforms and changes to the Rules,
which could increase efficiency while preserving or even strengthening
the effectiveness of the Commission. While I conclude that lack of
sufficient financial resources is one of the main factors contributing to
the current situation, I also argue for the implementation of several
measures that do not require additional resources or that could improve
the efficient use of the limited funds currently available to the
Commission.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. This article does not deal with the changes in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission
that were introduced on March 19, 2013 in detail. Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
IACHR Approves Reform of its Rules of Procedure, Policies and Practices (Washington, D.C.,
OF
AMERICAN
STATES,
Mar.
19,
2013),
ORGANIZATION
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2013/019.asp. The article makes references
to some of those reforms where pertinent. For an analysis of the draft of those reforms, see Letter
from Ariel Dulitzky, Dir., Human Rights Clinic, University of Texas School of Law, to Emilio
Álvarez Icaza, Executive Secretariat, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES,
available
at
http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/consulta2013/docs/UTAustin%20Human%20Rights%20Clinic%20C
omments%20on%20IACHR%20Proposals.pdf.
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE COMMISSION: MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS
INCLUDING ADJUDICATORY ONES
The OAS adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man (“American Declaration”) in May 1948.44 The
Commission was created ten years later, in 1959, with a vague mandate
and a weak juridical constitution.45 It is composed of seven members
who are elected in their individual capacity by the OAS General
Assembly.46 The Convention assigned the Commission specific
conventional duties and powers.47 It also created the IACHR, which is
composed of seven judges elected by the General Assembly of the
OAS.48 The IACHR is an autonomous organ of the OAS, as mandated
by the OAS Charter,49 the Convention, and its Statute.50 The body meets
in at least two regular sessions per year but may convene in
extraordinary circumstances.51 The Commission has been entrusted to
promote the observance and protection of human rights in the
Americas52 by exercising political, diplomatic, legal, and adjudicatory
powers.
The IACHR monitors compliance with treaty obligations for the
twenty-five member States that have ratified the Convention.53 The
Commission monitors compliance with the eleven member states that
have not yet become parties to the Convention by applying the human
44. See Organization of American States, American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. [hereinafter Declaration] (adopted by the Ninth International
Conference of American States on May 2, 1948).
45. What is the IACHR?, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (Jan. 27, 2013),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp.
46. American Convention, supra note 7, arts. 34, 36.
47. Id. art. 41.
48. Id. arts. 52−53.
49. Organization of American States Charter, Dec. 13, 1951, art. 106, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
50. Organization of American States, Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, art. 1, O.A.S. G.A. Res. 447 (Oct. 1979) [hereinafter Commission Statute].
51. Rules of Procedure, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., art. 14.1 [hereinafter Commission Rules
of Procedure] (amended 2011).
52. Id. art. 1.1.
53. Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Trinidad and
Tobago ratified the Convention on April 3, 1991 and denounced it on May 26, 1998. American
Convention On Human Rights "Pact Of San Jose, Costa Rica”, B-32, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144.
U.N.T.S.
144,
available
at
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm#. On September 12th 2012, Venezuela
announced its decision to denounce the American Convention in accordance with Article 78.
Letter from Mr. José Miguel Insulza, Secretary General, Organization of American States, to
Minister of Popular Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivian Republic of Venezuela, (Sept. 6,
2012),
available
at
http://www.oas.org/dil/Nota_Rep%C3%BAblica_Bolivariana_Venezuela_to_SG.English.pdf.
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rights obligations set forth in the Declaration.54 The Court monitors
compliance under the Convention for the twenty countries that have
become parties to the Convention and that have recognized its
compulsory jurisdiction.55
In addition to its adjudicative functions in the case system, the
IACHR has received other important promotional, monitoring, and
diplomatic tasks.56 These multiple functions compete for the scarce time
and resources of the Commission. In the last several years, the
Commission has increased the number of activities that it carries out in
addition to adjudicating cases.57 For instance, the IACHR has increased
the number of thematic reports it issues from one—prior to 2001—to
twenty between 2002 and 2010.58 In 2011, the IACHR “took cognizance
of over 400 urgent requests for precautionary measures, held 91
hearings and 54 Working Meetings, carried out over 30 Working Visits,
issued 138 Press Releases and conducted 5 Seminars and Training
Sessions.”59
Some of the additional promotional activities of the Commission
have direct and positive impact on the adjudication of cases.60 For
example, the Commission has created several “rapporteurships”61 that
54. Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago and U.S. The eleventh country,
which has not yet ratified the Convention, is Cuba. Resolution VI of the Eighth Meeting of
Consultation Ministers of Foreign Affairs (1962) excluded "the present government of Cuba from
participation in the inter-American system." See Interpretation of the American Declaration of
Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on
Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶¶ 40−45 (July
14, 1989); James Terry Roach and Jay Pinkerton v. United States of America, Case 9647, InterAm. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 3/87, OEA/Ser.L/V, ¶¶ 46−49 (1987).
55. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. For the situation of Venezuela, see supra note 53.
56. These additional duties include: developing awareness of human rights; making
recommendations to Member State governments; preparing studies and reports; requesting
information from Member States on the measures adopted to address human rights concerns;
responding to Member State inquiries on human rights matters and providing those States with
the requested advisory services if possible; and submitting an annual report to the General
Assembly of the OAS. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 41. See MAXIMIZING JUSTICE,
supra note 28, at 17.
57. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 17.
58. Information prepared for the Human Rights Clinic of the University of Texas School of
Law in relation to the draft Study on Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights [hereinafter Commission’s Answers].
59. See Position Document on the Process of Strengthening of the Inter-American System
for the Protection of Human Rights, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II, ¶ 29, doc. 68
(2012).
60. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 17.
61. Id. The IACHR has created thematic rapporteurships to devote its attention to key issues
and to certain groups, communities, and peoples that are in a situation of special vulnerability and
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focus on certain vulnerable groups in order to promote thematic areas.62
Rapporteurships play a role in the processing of individual petitions and
cases. Rapporteurships also draft decisions on admissibility and merits
for petitions and cases in their respective thematic areas, litigate or
support cases in their areas before the Court,63 provide expert
knowledge to the Commission in the handling of those cases, and follow
up on the Commission’s recommendations on those cases.64
The Commission conducts on-site and working visits to Member
States for the purpose of monitoring and promoting human rights in that
country.65 In the last decade, the Commission increased the number of
working visits it conducted.66 Visits provide support for the adjudicative
role of the Commission as they help the Commission contextualize the
individual complaints and facilitate the understanding of the underlying
problems. The visits also raise the profile of the Commission, which in
turn attracts new petitions and strengthens the legitimacy of the
Commission by supporting implementation of its decisions.67 Visits
further afford petitioners the opportunity to file new complaints68 or to

have faced historical discrimination. The aim of the thematic rapporteurships is to strengthen,
promote, and systematize the Commission's own work on the pertinent issue. The offices of
rapporteurs may be assigned to a member of the Commission or to other persons designated by
the Commission. Currently there are eight Rapporteurships on Women, Children, Migrant
Workers and their Families, Human Rights Defenders, Afrodescendants and Against Racial
Discrimination, Persons Deprived of Their Liberty, Indigenous Peoples and Freedom of
Expression. The last one is the only rapporteurship assigned to a Special Rapporteur who is not a
member of the Commission. See Thematic Rapporteurships and Units for Inter-American
OF
AMERICAN
STATES,
Commission
on
Human
Rights,
ORGANIZATION
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/rapporteurships.asp (last visited July 29, 2013).
62. Id.
63. Id. For instance, IACHR Application before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
in the case of Claude Reyes et al. (Marcel Claude Reyes, Sebastian Cox Urrejola, and Arturo
Longton Guerrero) Case No. 12.108 against the State of Chile (appointing Eduardo Bertoni, then
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, as Legal advisor of the Commission). See Claude
Reyes et al. v. Chile, Case 12.108, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 60/03 (July 8, 2005),
available
at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/demandas/12.108%20Claude%20Reyes%20Chile%208jul05%20ENGLI
SH.pdf.
64. For example, the website of the Rapporteurship on the Rights of the Child (stating that
“[t]he Rapporteurship provides advice to the IACHR in the proceedings of individual petitions,
cases and requests of precautionary and provisional measures which address the rights of the
child”). See Rapporteurship on the Rights of the Child, ORG. OF AM. STATES,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/children (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
65. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 18.
66. In 2002, the IACHR conducted five on-site country visits. In 2010, there were 10. See
Commission’s Answers, supra note 58, at 12.
67. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 18.
68. For instance, during the visit to Peru in 1999, the Commission received more than 600
new petitions. See Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 2, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 59 rev. 3 (2000).
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present new evidence.69 In addition to those benefits, visits give the
Commission the chance to facilitate friendly settlements negotiations,
evaluate implementation of previous recommendations, and promote
strategies to apply the Convention and other Inter-American instruments
and facilitate full compliance with the decisions of the Commission and
the Court.70
In sum, the multiple functions of the Commission are both an asset
and a hindrance. As these functions have expanded to include the
adjudicatory role, they have also resulted in a backlog of cases and
presented important identity challenges to the IACHR. Today, OAS
Member States are discussing where the focus of the Commission’s
work should lie, and how the IACHR should balance all its different
activities.71
A. Case Adjudication
The Commission processes individual complaints acting as a
quasi-judicial adjudicative body.72 Any person, group of persons, or
non-governmental organization (NGO) claiming a violation of the rights
protected in the American Convention,73 the American Declaration, or
any other Inter-American instrument may file a petition.74 The petition
may be presented on behalf of the person filing the petition or on behalf

69. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 18.
70. For instance, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Press Release 89/11: IACHR Concludes Working
Visit to Paraguay. Washington, D.C., Aug. 12, 2011 (stating that the purpose of the visit was to
conduct promotional activities, encourage compliance with the decisions of Commission and the
Court, promote the use of the friendly settlement mechanism and to further its understanding of
the human rights situation in Paraguay). See Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., IACHR
Concludes Working Visit to Paraguay, Press Release 89/11 (Aug. 12, 2011).
71. OAS Working Group, supra note 15.
72. W. Michael Reisman, Practical Matters for Consideration in the Establishment of a
Regional Human Rights Mechanism: Lessons from the Inter-American Experience, 1995 ST.
LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 89 (1995).
73. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 44.
74. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 23. The other instruments are the
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against
Women “Convention of Belem do Para,” June 9, 1994, O.A.S.T.S. 1994 A-61 (entered into force
Mar. 5, 1995), art. 12 [Convention of Belem do Para]; Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearance of Persons, June 9, 1994, O.A.S.T.S. 1994 A-60 (entered into force Mar. 28 1996),
art. 13 [Convention on Forced Disappearances]; Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture, Sept. 12, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. 1985 No. 67 A-51 (entered into force Feb. 28, 1987),
arts. 8, 16; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights “Protocol of San Salvador,” Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S.
1988 No. 69 A-52 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1999), art. 19.6.
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of a third person.75 The Commission may only process individual
petitions against OAS member states.76
The petitions presented to the Commission must show that the
victim has exhausted all domestic remedies or that there is a permissible
exception to this requirement.77 If domestic remedies have been
exhausted, the petition must be presented to the Commission within six
months after the notification of the final decision in the domestic
proceedings.78
Upon receiving a complaint, the Commission, acting through its
Executive Secretariat, assigns the complaint a number and starts to
evaluate it as a petition.79 If the petition meets prima facie elements for
processability, it is transmitted to the State requesting its response on
the admissibility requirements.80 The Commission can declare the
petition inadmissible and issue an express decision to that effect, thus
terminating the petition; or it can find the petition admissible, at which
point the petition is registered as a case.81 The Commission need not
formally declare a petition admissible before addressing the merits;82
nevertheless, the Commission will do so in most cases. In serious and
urgent cases, or when it is believed that the life or personal integrity of a
person is in real and imminent danger, the Commission may request a
response on the admissibility and merits.83 Also, in exceptional
circumstances, the Commission may defer its admissibility decision and
address it simultaneously with its final decision on the merits.84 Once a
case is registered, the IACHR will give petitioners time to file a brief on

75. Metropolitan Nature Reserve v. Panama, Case 11.533, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 88/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 70 rev. ¶ 27 (2003) (stating that referral to the Commission
of individual petitions does not require, unlike established practice under the European System or
under the United Nations Human Rights Committee, that petitioners be victims per se).
76. Brian D. Tittemore, The Dann Litigation and International Human Rights Law: The
Proceedings and Decision of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 593, 600 (2007).
77. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 46; Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note
51, art. 31; see, e.g., Medellin, Ramírez Cardenas and Leal García, United States, Case 12.644,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 90/90 (2009).
78. See American Convention, supra note 7, art. 46.1.b; Commission Rules of Procedure,
supra note 51, art. 32.1.
79. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 29.1.a.
80. Id. arts. 30.1−30.2.
81. Id. arts. 36.1−30.2.
82. Id. art. 36.3; see, e.g., Velasquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 1, ¶¶ 39−41 (June 26, 1989) (stating that there is nothing in the
Convention or in the Rules that requires an express declaration of admissibility, either at the
Secretariat stage or later, when the Commission itself is involved).
83. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, at arts 30.4, 30.7.
84. Id. art. 36.3.
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the merits.85 The Commission will transmit that brief to the State and
ask for its observations.86
The IACHR can convene hearings on petitions and cases.87
“During the hearing, the parties may present any document, testimony,
expert report or item of evidence. At the request of a party or on its own
initiative, the Commission may receive the testimony of witnesses or
experts.”88
At any point during the petition or case process, but always before
ruling on the merits, at the request of the parties or at its own initiative,
the Commission should attempt to engage in friendly settlement
proceedings.89 If an agreement between the parties is reached, the
Commission adopts a report on the agreement.90 If the process fails, the
Commission rules on the merits, and transmits this preliminary report to
the State with time to implement its recommendations.91 If the State has
ratified the Convention and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, the
IACHR may refer the case to the Court for a decision on the merits.92
When the State has failed to comply with its recommendations, there is
a presumption that the Commission will refer the case to the Court.93
If the case is not transmitted to the Court, the Commission shall
issue a final merits report and give additional time to comply with the
recommendations.94 Finally, the IACHR must decide whether to publish
it.95 The Commission may then adopt the appropriate follow-up
measures.96
III. A BRIEF METHODOLOGICAL NOTE ON OUR RESEARCH97
In order to study the pace of adjudication, the Human Rights Clinic
created a database chronicling the length of time of each step in the
Commission’s procedures for every adjudicated petition and case since
1996 and up to 2010.98 The decisions themselves, located on the
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. art. 37.1.
Id.
Id. art. 64.1.
Id. art. 65.1.
Rules of Procedure, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., art. 40.1 (amended 2011).
Id. art. 40.5.
Id. art. 44.2.
Id. art. 45.2. See also American Convention, supra note 7, art. 62.1.
Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 45.1.
Id. arts. 47.1−47.2
Id. art. 47.3.
Id. art. 48.1.
See MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 30−31.
The database continues to be updated by the Human Rights Clinic. It can be accessed by
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Commission’s website, served as the source of the data.99 We also
compiled the length of time the procedures took for each case in the
Court. The database omits petitions and cases that are currently waiting
in the Commission’s docket as we do not have access to them. The
Clinic created a table with all the published decisions and coded the
dates of the initial submission and the date of the adoption of the
published report, using the data contained in those reports.
The database is limited as it only reflects the cases with published
decisions. This limitation is likely insignificant to our final conclusions,
because if anything, this omission leads to an understatement of the
length of delays, as is later explained. In the past, the Commission chose
to review petitions based on the strength of the petitioner’s facts, the
legal arguments raised, the attitude of the respondent Government,
and/or the constant follow-up of the petitioner.100 Only recently has the
Commission adopted a stricter chronological order policy.101 Because
previously published decisions were prioritized based on their strength,
the database is predictably biased towards petitions and cases with
speedier adjudications.102 Our findings go up to the end of 2010, the last
published Annual Report at the time we concluded our study.
In addition, this article’s findings are based on the analysis of
quantitative data, interviews conducted with officers of the
Commission’s Executive Secretariat, extensive research of primary and
secondary sources, as well as my personal experience serving as
Assistant Executive Secretary of the Commission between 2001 and
2007. In March 2011, the Clinic prepared a list of questions that were
submitted to the Executive Secretary of the Commission. The Clinic
received comprehensive answers to these questions on October 4, 2011.
The Clinic concluded its Report in December 2011, and in March of
2012, we presented the results of our study to the plenary of the
Commission. The report was released in July 2012.

the public upon request to the Clinic.
99. Reports on Cases for Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/cases_reports.asp.
100. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 31. It is my understanding that this policy was
unusual for international and regional human rights bodies.
101. Id. Even so, there are clear exceptions to this rule. For example, consider the disparities
among these three decisions adopted in March 2010 dealing with Brazilian petitions filed from
2001 to 2005. José Do Egito Romão Diniz v. Brazil, Petition No. 262-05, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 6/10 (Mar. 15, 2010) (submitted Mar. 14, 2005); Fátima Regina Nascimento de
Oliveira and Maura Tatiane Ferreira Alves v. Brazil, Petition No. 12.378, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 7/10 (Mar. 15, 2010) (submitted Mar. 22, 2001); Ivanildo Amaro da Silva et al.
v. Brazil, Petition No. 1198-05, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., report No. 38/10 (Mar. 17, 2010)
(submitted Oct. 24, 2005), all available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/casos/10.eng.htm.
102. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 31.
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IV. THE CURREN
NT SITUATION
N OF THE CASE
E SYSTEM: BA
ACKLOGGED,
FRONTLOADEED AND SLOW
W PROCESS
Th
here is a gen
neral consensus that the Commissionn’s adjudicattory
processs is complex
x, lengthy an
nd slow.103 O
Our research shows that the
Commiission has a large backlo
og of cases aand petitionss, and there are
long prrocedural dellays.104 The Commission
C
is aware of aand agrees w
with
this diaagnosis.105
Th
he Commissiion receives between
b
1,3000 and 1,5000 petitions evvery
106
year. This numb
ber has increeased exponnentially in the last fiftteen
j
from
m 439 in 199
97 to 1598 inn 2010.107 Currrently there are
years, jumping
approxiimately 5,200 petitions waiting
w
for ann initial revieew, dating back
to 2008
8.108 This baccklog of new petitions is ddrastically loower than it w
was

103. See
S OAS Workin
ng Group, supra note 15. The OA
AS Member Statees had identifiedd that
one of th
he “main challenges” of the Systtem is to “increaase efficiency annd expediency inn the
processing
g of petitions and
d cases.” Id. at VIIII.ii.1. Already iin 2000, the OAS
S recommended too the
Commissiion to make “alll necessary effo
orts to ensure thaat individual casses are processeed as
expeditiou
usly as possible..” OAS General Assembly, Ressolution AG/RES
S. 1701 (XXX-O
O/00)
Evaluatio
on of the Working
gs of the Inter-A
American System for the Protectioon and Promotioon of
Human Rights
R
with a View
w to its Improvem
ment and Strength
thening, CP/CAJP
P-1823/01 rev. 1, art.
6.c.
104. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 24.
105. ORGANIZATION OF
O AMERICAN STATES, INTER-A
AM. COMM’N H.R
R., STRATEGIC PLAN
2011–201
15, PART I: 50 YEARS DEFENDIN
NG HUMAN RIGH
HTS: RESULTS AN
ND CHALLENGES
S, 59
(Jan. 2011
1) [hereinafter STRATEGIC
T
PLAN PART I].
106. See
S Inter-Am. Co
omm’n H.R., IAC
CHR Annual Repport 2010, OEA/S
Ser.L/V/II.40, dooc. 5,
at ch. III, available at http:://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/20010eng/TOC.htm..
107. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 24.
108. Id.
I at 26.
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previously, as the Executive Secretariat brought in additional resources
to specifically eliminate this backlog by the year 2015. Only since 2008
has the Commission been able to evaluate more petitions per year than it
receives.109
Only 10% to 13% of new petitions are found by the Secretariat
to be receivable or processable, which means that they meet the
minimum requirements to be transmitted to the State.110 The Executive
Secretariat summarily dismisses 87% to 90% without receiving any
formal, public decision by the Commission.111 As such, this process lacks
any type of oversight and accountability. Neither the members of the
Commission nor the public in general know about the types of complaints,
the States concerned, nor the reasons for the dismissal of 90 % of the new
petitions by the Executive Secretariat. Even with this high percentage of
new petitions dismissed, 130 to 275 new petitions are added to the
Commission’s docket yearly.112
The Commission cannot keep up with the demand for rulings on
petitions and cases, thus forming a backlog. In 2010, the Commission
added 275 new petitions to its docket. But that year, which was its most
productive, the Commission only ruled on 153 petitions and cases,
including fifty-five archival decisions.113 Only fifteen of these decisions
fully adjudicated a petition, with four merits decisions, and eleven
friendly settlements.114 On top of that, the Commission referred sixteen
cases to the Court that year.115 The fifty-five archival decisions have
effects similar to that of inadmissibility decisions in that they are
eliminated from the list of pending cases and petitions.116 Of the
remaining decisions, only seventy-three were determined admissible,
which is just the first step in the process.117

109. Id.
110. Id. at 25.
111. Id.
112. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 25.
113. Id. at 25. Archived cases are those where the grounds for the petition or case do not exist
or subsist or where the information necessary for the adoption of a decision is unavailable. As a
result, the Commission notifies the parties of the possibility of a decision to archive, requests
more information, and eventually decides to archive the case. Commission Rules of Procedure,
supra note 51, art. 42.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 26.
117. Id.
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Numberr of pendiing petitiions and cases

hese numberrs demonstraate that the ffocus of the Commissionn is
Th
not on the
t merits staage, which iss the only onne that providdes victims w
with
an opportunity to receive
r
somee kind of reddress. Since 2002, with the
exceptiion of 2009, the Commisssion has pub
ublished less than ten meerits
decisions every yeear. In 2010, just over 15% of thee Commissioon’s
decisions were fullly adjudicateed in the foorm of a meerits or frienndly
settlem
ment decision.118 We did not include arcchival decisioons as decisioons,
which definitively
d
decide
d
cases and
a petitions. Although arrchived cases are
eliminaated from the docket, thesee decisions ddo not containn any explicit or
implicitt determinatio
on on the com
mplaint, nor doo they result in final relieff for
the petitioner. Even
n including the cases suubmitted to the Court, tthat
numberr only rises to
o 29% of casses being fullly decided.
While
W
the Com
mmission, wiith limited resources and a diversifiedd set
of activ
vities, producces more deccisions than in the past,119 an increassing
numberr of petition
ns and cases remain in the system without a fiinal
decision. According
g to the Exeecutive Secreetariat, by thhe end of 20008,
1,296 petitions
p
and cases were being processsed, with 9004 (69%) in the
admissiibility stage and 392 (31%) in the m
merits stage.1220 As of Auggust
30, 20
011, those numbers
n
greew to 5,2133 petitions pending iniitial

118. Id.
I at 27.
119. Thirty-one
T
decisio
ons in 1996 and 139
1 in 2010. See table of decisions by year.
120. Santiago
S
A. Cantton, Exec. Sec'y of the Inter-Am.. Comm'n on H.R
R., Short-, Mediium-,
and Long
g-Term Budgetary
y Requirements of
o the Inter-Ameerican Commissioon on Human Rigghts,
Presentatiion at the Joint Meeting
M
of the Committee
C
on Juuridical and Poliitical Affairs andd the
Committeee on Administtrative and Bud
dgetary Affairs,, 3 (Feb. 5, 22009), availablee at
scm.oas.o
org/doc_public/EN
NGLISH/HIST_0
09/CP21665E11.ddoc [hereinafter Presentation off the
Executivee Sec’y].
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evaluattion,121 1,13
37 (69%) petitions aawaiting ann admissibiility
decision,122 and 515
5 (31%) mattters awaitingg a decision oon the meritss.123
In 2010, its most productive year, the C ommission’ss percentagee of
merits decisions waas lower than
n the percenttage of casess pending in the
merits stage
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o merits deccisions versuss 31% of casses in the meerits
1
stage).124
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vor of admisssibility decisions is helppful
for elim
minating cleaarly meritlesss petitions,1255 but it furthher increases the
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docket of pending
g petitions and
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cases (inn admissibillity and meerits
stages) grew 27.46
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y 31.39%.
increased, in the sam

Ev
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wer than whaat it
was in 1996.127 Tod
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minates 20% fewer cases aand

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Commission’s
C
An
nswers, supra notte 58, at 16.
MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 27.
Id.
I
Id.
I
Id.
I
Id.
I
Id.
I at 30.
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petitions from its docket than it did fifteen years ago.128 Additionally,
the Commission now eliminates more cases and petitions through
procedural decisions than through decisions on the merits, friendly
settlement, or referrals to the Court.129 In 1996 the Commission
eliminated almost 70% of its cases through friendly settlement, merit, or
referrals to the Court compared with approximately 20% through
archival and inadmissibility decisions.130 In 2010 the proportion
reverted to just over 45% through archival and inadmissibility decisions,
and a little over 20% in final decisions based on the merits of the case.131
The Commission explains its focus on the initial stages of petitions
as a stepped approach in addressing the backlog.132 As the current
backlog predominantly lies in the initial phases and given the lack of
resources, the Commission needed to concentrate in the stage with the
biggest backlog.133 The Commission argues that additional resources
could be allocated to other stages once the delay, in its early stages, is
more reasonable.134
While it is understandable that the Commission needed to start
somewhere, and though there may be a higher number of backlogged
new petitions or petitions in the admissibility stage, it is questionable
whether taking an approach which does not consider the process as a
whole will help reduce the overall backlog of the Commission and not
simply defer the backlog to later and more time-consuming stages.
Some numbers illustrate the consequences of the Commission’s
backlog and its focus on the initial stages of the procedure. The IACHR
adopted eighty-three reports—the highest number of admissibility
reports within one year—in 2010. As of August 30, 2011, there were
1,137 matters awaiting an admissibility decision.135 Even if no new
petitions were filed, at the 2010 pace, it would take nearly sixteen years
to fully decide all the admissibility petitions. For the merits decisions,
only twenty-six cases were decided on the merits in 2010, but as of
August 30, 2011, there were 515 matters awaiting a decision on the
128. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF TEXAS SCH. OF LAW, MAXIMIZING JUSTICE,
MINIMIZING DELAY: STREAMLINING PROCEDURES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
(2011),
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_Justice_Minimizing_Delay_at
_the_IACHR.pdf
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 29. Information provided by current and former members of the Secretariat.
133. Commission’s Answers, supra note 58, at 5.
134. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 29. Information provided by current and former
members of the Secretariat.
135. Id. at 26.
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1
merits.136
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backlog
g without add
dressing any new cases.
In
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he proposal for the IACHR Rulees of Procedure, 10 (June 30, 20009),
available at http://cejil..org/en/categoria//tipo-de-documennto/institutional [hereinafter CE
EJIL
Observatiions].
138. STRATEGIC PLAN
N PART I, supra no
ote 105, at 20.
139. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 30.
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Moreover, the average length has increased for all four types of
decisions in the period covered by our database (1996-2010).140 The
average wait time for an admissibility decision was over four years for
decisions published between 2002 and 2010, but just under three years
in the period between 1996-2001. Our data suggests that the changes in
the Commission’s Rules in 2000 increased the time of adjudication.
Similarly, for merits decisions, the average number of years that a
petitioner has to wait is now higher than it was prior to 2008, the year
the Executive Secretariat underwent major restructuring.141 As expected,
our database was favorable to the Commission as it reflects only
published decisions and not those petitions and cases waiting in the
docket. According to IACHR’s data, the current average length of
proceedings for petitions in the admissibility stage awaiting a decision is
seventy months (6.83 years).142 Our data showed 4.02 years. The
IACHR identified the average length of proceedings for cases in the
merits stage awaiting a decision as eighty-six months (7.2 years).143
This again is longer than the 6.51 years that our data suggests.144

Average Years for Commission’s Decisions

Admissibility

Archival

Inadmissibility

Friendly Settlement

Merits

Total

Count of petitions

596

69

136

86

172

1,059

Average Years

4.02

10.90

4.78

6.16

6.51

5.14

Std Dev Year

2.86

4.82

2.98

3.37

3.29

3.63

Median Years

3.25

8.04

4.40

5.87

5.96

4.29

Max Years

20.92

19.85

14.60

20.56

14.67

Min Years

0.39

2.36

0.31

0.99

1.29

140.
years.
141.
142.
143.
144.

The Clinic excluded archival decisions, as they were made public only in the last two
MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 32.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 35.
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Of course, if the Commission is dealing with its backlog of new
petitions, the length of the procedure will increase because the IACHR
will be deciding petitions and cases that have already been waiting for
years.
Also, the new practice of addressing petitions and cases in
chronological order rather than by any other measure of priority may
contribute to the increase in wait time. This is because the Commission
is resolving cases that have already been delayed for some time.
Nevertheless, the higher average of wait time cannot be entirely
attributed to this shift in practice. The upward trend in wait time began
before the Commission started to deal with backlogged petitions and the
stronger focus on a chronological order.145
To account for the disparity of dealing with older backlogged
petitions we also measured the time between transmission of a petition
to the State and the time of the Commission’s decision on the merits. By
some doing, we are able to control the impact of the reduction of
backlog of new petitions (as done by the Registry) by analyzing the
average length of the proceeding. In the period from 1996 to 2001, an
average of over 4.1 years elapsed from the time a petition was
transmitted to a State to the time the Commission decided the case on
the merits. From 2002-2007, that time decreased to just under three-anda-half years.146 However, in the period from 2008-2010, an average of
six years elapsed from the petition’s filing with the State to the case’s
merits decision.147 In other words, prioritizing chronological order
necessarily means the average wait time will increase. But this change
does not entirely account for all increases in adjudication times for
petitions and cases, as the Commission does not follow a strict
chronological order.148

145. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 45.
146. Id. at 33. During that period however, it still took an average of just over four years from
the filing of a petition to the decision on the merits. Thus, more time was spent during the initial
processing and the overall average time did not decrease.
147. Id. at 33−34.
148. Id.
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Court: Average Time by Period (Years)
Year
Period

Average of Years
from
Filing
of
Petition
with
Commission
to
Filing with Court

Average of Years
from File Date
with Court to
Merits

Average
of
Years
from
Beginning to
End

19891996

2.53

2.38

6.93

19962001

3.09

2.36

6.57

20022007

5.80

1.68

7.67

20082010

7.37

1.49

9.08

The length of adjudication for cases in the Court further increases
wait times.149 Cases before the Court take an average of almost eight
years from the time the petition is filed with the Commission to the
Court’s final resolution.150 Cases spent an average of one year and nine
months in the Court after an average of more than five years and nine
months in the Commission.151 The time that a petition or case takes to
be processed by the Commission is much longer than the time it takes
for a case to be processed by the Court. Because of the Commission’s
larger caseload and additional procedural stages, an increased amount of
time for the Commission to dispose of its cases is expected.152 Also, the
Commission carries out many more functions than the Court does.153
Thus, not all the Commission’s resources—be it time, funding or staff—
can be allocated to individual complaints in the same manner as the

149. Id. at 35.
150. Id. The length of time is underestimated because in some cases, the final disposition is
not the judgment itself but an interpretation of the Court’s judgment, pursuant to Article 68 of the
Court’s Rules of Procedure. It is possible to also add the time that the case spends in the
supervision stage until there is full compliance with the Tribunal’s decision. We decided not to
count those years, as we were only interested in the time it takes for the Inter-American bodies to
rule on the merits of a claim.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. As described in section II, the Commission carries promotional, diplomatic and
monitoring activities. The Court performs only adjudicative and limited advisory functions.
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Court can do.154 Nevertheless, since the Commission is a quasi-judicial
body with more relaxed evidentiary rules, more general flexibility, and
more negotiating powers, adjudication should take less time in the
Commission than in the Court.155 The differences do not provide easy
explanations to the fact that the time the Commission takes to process a
case has consistently increased while the time for procedures in the
Court has been in steady decline.156
There is no significant difference in the time spent in the
Commission’s proceedings between those cases that were finally
decided by the Commission and those that were eventually decided by
the Court.157 The Commission disposed of cases submitted to the Court
an average of nine months faster than those that were never submitted to
the Court.158 This discrepancy can be explained by the way we
measured time periods and by the process of the publication of merits
reports.159 The database records the date of publication of merits reports
by the Commission, rather than the initial, unpublished adoption of the
merits report.160 The time between the adoption of preliminary merits
reports and publication of final merits reports is substantial. The
Commission is required to first grant time to the State to comply with
the Commission’s preliminary merits report before adopting a final
merits report; and then, after granting additional time to the State, to
decide its publication.161

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF TEXAS SCH. OF LAW, MAXIMIZING JUSTICE,
MINIMIZING DELAY: STREAMLINING PROCEDURES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
38
(2011),
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_Justice_Minimizing_Delay_at
_the_IACHR.pdf.
157. Id. at 35−36.
158. Id. at 36.
159. Id.
160. See American Convention, supra note 7, arts. 50−51. See also Commission Rules of
Procedure, supra note 51, arts. 45, 47.
161. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 36. See also Commission Rules of Procedure,
supra note 51, arts. 47.1−47.3.
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V. PROCEDURAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS AND THEIR IMPACT
162
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE COMMISSION
In the last decade, the Commission has enacted several major
procedural, administrative and technological changes, some of which
were specifically designed to deal with the backlog and procedural
delays.163 Particularly, the Commission twice made extensive rule
changes that drastically altered the structure of the proceedings.164
A. 2000 Rules of Procedure Reforms
The most extensive rule revision occurred in 2000. The change
divided the procedure into admissibility and merits. Reducing the
backlog and timely resolution of petitions and cases were not explicit
goals of these amendments.165 By splitting the admissibility phase and the
merits phase into two separate stages, the overall impact of the 2000
changes to the duration and backlog was negative.166 Doing so shifted the

162. In addition to the procedural reforms and the organizational changes explained in the
text, in 2011, the Commission published a strategic plan, which included goals through the year
2015. Maximizing, supra note 28, at 59. (citing ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTERAM. COMM’N H.R., STRATEGIC PLAN 2011-2015: PROGRAMS AND ACTIONS PLANS (2011)
[hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN PART II]. The plan establishes concrete goals and specific targets,
including reducing the backlog and length of adjudication as one of its priorities. "According to
the Commission’s estimates, in order to achieve the goals in the plan, the budget must increase by
over two and a half times between now and 2015." MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 5961. The goal of the IACHR is that by December 31, 2013, no petition presented prior to
December 31, 2010 should be under review." Id. at 60. The Strategic Plan aims to eliminate the
backlog in the admissibility and merits phases by 2015. Id. During this period, the Sections would
have to quadruple their production capacity for the production of admissibility reports, and in the
merits phase, the Sections would have to increase their production capacity six- fold. Id. at 59−61.
The Strategic Plan demonstrates that the Commission is moving in the right direction and that it is
committed to eliminate its backlog and speed up the process. Id at 61. However, in analyzing the
likelihood of actually reaching these goals, the Strategic Plan falls short as it relies heavily on
increased funding but does not include alternative plans if the funds do not materialize. Id. The
Commission recognizes that its main strategy is receiving additional funding by stating that, “if
the projected resources do not materialize or if only a portion of them materialize, the projection
under this plan will have to be revisited.” STRATEGIC PLAN PART II, at 78. The Strategic Plan
also fails to recognize that without significantly changing how petitions and cases are adjudicated,
there is little reason to believe that the 2015 goals will be achieved even with additional funds.
MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 62. The feasibility of these objectives also fails to
consider capacity limitations of the staff, and overall lack of time of both Commissioners and
staffers to consider the new number of intended reports without transforming the IACHR into a
permanent body. David C. Steelman What Have We Learned About Court Delay, “Local Legal
Culture,” And Caseflow Management Since The Late 1970s? 19 JUST. SYS. J. 145 (1997) at 159
(stating that a court may reach a point of “saturation” after which other steps need to be taken).
163. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 47.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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concentration of resources to the preliminary stages of the procedure
and lengthened its overall duration.167
Before 2000, the Commission generally ruled on both the
admissibility and merits of a case in a single joint decision.168 In the new
Rules of Procedure, the Commission created a two-stage process,
requiring a separate report deciding whether petitions met the
admissibility requirements.169 The Rules included a timeline for the
submission of admissibility considerations that did not allow any
extensions beyond three months, but they did not stipulate the
consequences of the State’s failure to respond.170
The effect of this change was felt immediately. Between 1996 and
2001, the Commission adopted 146 independent admissibility
determinations; between 2002 and 2007, that number almost doubled to
275; and between 2008 and 2010 the IACHR adopted 175.171 Those
increased numbers were not in addition to merits decisions, but to the
detriment of them. The two-stage procedure shifted the concentration of
the Commission decisions from joint admissibility and merits decisions
to admissibility decisions.172 Fifty-four percent of the decisions adopted
by the IACHR between 1996 and 2001 were admissibility decisions and
46% were final decisions on the merits (including friendly settlement,
merits decisions, and cases filed with the Court).173 Over the next eight
years, the percentage of decisions on the merits and friendly settlements
dropped to 17%, and 83% became admissibility or archival decisions.174
If we add the cases submitted to the Court, 32% were fully decided
while 68% of decisions were admissibility or archival.175

167. Id.
168. See MONICA PINTO, LA DENUNCIA ANTE LA COMISIÓN INTERAMERICANA DE
DERECHOS HUMANOS 83 (Editores del Puerto 1994).
169. In part, the Commission was responding to the requests formulated by the States in the
previous years. See Resolution AG/RES. 1701, supra note 103, art. 6.b (recommending the
Commission to resolve “questions pertaining to the admissibility of individual petitions by
opening a separate, mandatory procedure and issuing their findings by way of concise resolutions,
the publication of which shall not prejudge the responsibility of the State”).
170. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 30.4.
171. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 47−48.
172. Id. at 49.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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Th
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majoritty decision saying
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182. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 50.
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When the Court issued separate decisions on preliminary objections,
merits, and reparations, it took an average of two years and two months
for a case to be fully resolved by the Court.188 Now that the Court has
combined the decisions it takes an average of just over one year and
seven months.189 Although the average time from when a petition is
filed with the Commission to when it is decided by the Court increased
by one year and five months after the Court combined its decisions, that
increase actually represents an increase in the Commission’s process,
not the Court’s.190 After the Court changed its procedure to combine
decisions (and the Commission divided decisions at the same time), the
average time that a petition or case spent in the Commission more than
doubled, while the average time a case spent with the Court
decreased.191
Finally, the 2000 changes included, for the first time, a follow-up
mechanism to monitor the implementation of the recommendations of
the Commission included in its merits or friendly settlement reports.192
B. 2009 Rules of Procedure Reforms
In 2009, the Commission adopted a second set of revisions to its
Rules of Procedure with the stated goals of enhancing “participation by
victims, guarantees to harmonize procedural participation of the parties
and enhance the publicity and transparency of the system.”193 Again,
reducing the backlog or speeding-up the process were not official goals
of the reforms.
The reforms granted petitioners and States more time to submit
additional observations on the merits.194 While the additional time may
be necessary, it is usually used as a delaying mechanism by States and
as such, is antithetical to the goal of reducing the length of the
Commission’s procedure, unless this extension is aimed at ensuring
timely substantive observations. Other provisions included a limitation

188. Id. at 74.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 46.
193. Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., CIDH Publishes Its New Rules of Procedure,
No. 84/09 (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/English/2009/8409eng.html.
194. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, arts. 37.1−37.2.

2013]

Too Little, Too Late

161

on when challenges to admissibility could be submitted195 and a
provision allowing the receipt of testimony during on-site visits.196
The Rules also included clear provisions for archiving cases.197
Archiving petitions and cases reduces the backlog of the Commission
because it eliminates inactive complaints from the docket of the
Commission. Importantly, the Commission has begun to publish
information on archival decisions only in the past two years.198
Per the 2009 changes, the Commission may suspend the time limit
to refer a case to the Court if the State in question is willing to
implement the Commission’s recommendations and the State consents
to the suspension.199 This provision, which reflects the previous
unregulated practice of the IACHR, could represent a tension between
the efficiency of the System and its effectiveness.200 Efficiency goes
down by lengthening the procedure while the Commission waits to see
if the State implements its recommendations.201 At the same time,
compliance with the Commission’s decisions may increase because this
provision offers the States an alternative to submission to the Court if
the State complies with the Commission’s recommendations.202
In addition, the 2009 reforms continue to elaborate on the
functions of Working Groups. According to Articles 15 and 35, a
Working Group on Admissibility shall be established to study, between
sessions, the admissibility of petitions and make recommendations to
the plenary.203
In 2009, the Commission and the Court changed the way the
Commission transfers a case to the Court.204 Prior to this, the
Commission had to write a full legal brief with all legal arguments and
evidence in order to submit a case to the Court. Now, when transferring
a case to the Court, the Commission must only submit the merits report,
the observations on the State’s answer to the report, and the reasons for
submitting the case to the Court.205 The Court has also reduced the
Commission’s role as advocate in Court proceedings and has given it

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. art. 30.6.
Id. art. 39.
Id. art. 42.
MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 53.
Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 46.
MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 53.
Id.
Id. at 54.
Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, arts. 15, 35.
Id. art. 74.
Id.
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more of a neutral position.206 This change shifts the emphasis to the
petitioner and the State as parties to the case.207 The Commission,
however, still presents final observations after both parties have made
oral arguments.208
It is too early to judge whether the 2009 amendments will have an
impact on the backlog and delays at the Commission level. If the
Commission does not take a prominent role in the litigation of cases at
the Court, if it is not required to prepare an additional brief to submit the
case to the Tribunal, and if its role in the public hearings is more
limited, it is possible that the Commission will be able to re-allocate
some of its resources and time to deal with its backlog rather than to
litigate in front of the Court.
As previously stated, the Commission recently adopted a new set
of revisions to its Rules. Again, those changes do not pursue any
explicit measures to speed up the process nor to reduce the
Commission’s backlog. In fact, the revisions extend some of the
deadlines for the submissions of information. However, the 2013
revisions provide some welcome clarity on some criteria, such as when
the Commission may expedite the evaluation of a petition;209 criteria for
joining the admissibility and merits stages;210 reasons for allowing the
revision of an archival decision211 or considerations for the temporal
suspension of the time limit to refer the case to the Court.212
C. Changes in the Executive Secretariat
The Executive Secretariat of the IACHR is a “specialized unit of
the General Secretariat of the Organization [that. . .] shall be provided
with the resources required to accomplish the tasks assigned to it by the
213
Commission.” As a permanent body (as opposed to the part-time
nature of the Commissioners’ positions), the Executive Secretariat plays
a fundamental and largely discretionary part in the Commission’s work
processing individual petitions.214 The Executive Secretariat drafts all
the petitions, case reports, and applications to the Court. Also the

206. INTER-AM. CT. H.R., Statement of Motives for the Reform of the Rules of Procedure, 2,
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/reglamento_eng.cfm.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 3.
209. See Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 29.2.
210. See id. art. 36.3.
211. See id. art. 42.
212. See id. art. 46.
213. See id. art. 21.1.
214. David Harris, Regional Protection of Human Rights; The Inter-American Achievement,
THE INTER-AM. SYS. OF H.R., 19 (David Harris and Stephen Livingstone eds., Oxford, 1998).
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Secretariat is responsible for administering the process, as it receives
and processes the correspondence on petitions and cases; the Secretariat
requests parties to provide any information it deems relevant, fixes the
deadlines for those submissions, and grants extensions to receive those
responses.215 Crucially, the Commission has delegated to the Executive
Secretariat the power to revise new complaints and to reject those that
do not meet the prima facie normative requirements.216
Since 2001, the Secretariat has undergone two phases of reform,
with the goal of maximizing its output and better utilizing its limited
resources.217 In the first phase, the main priority was to improve
standardization and coherence within the legal work of the
Commission.218 The Executive Secretariat created advisory groups that
assisted in the review of initial petitions and in the assessment of
requests for precautionary measures to ensure consistent standards
across States. In 2004, the Executive Secretariat created the litigation or
Court group responsible for supporting the Commission’s participation
in Court proceedings.219
The second phase of reorganization specifically targeted the
efficiency of the case system.220 In 2007, the Executive Secretariat
created four regional groups that consolidated the country desks.221
Each regional group is responsible for handling outreach, observations,
and on-site visits in their respective regions and States, as well as the
processing of individual petitions, including drafting reports.222 This
allowed for the even distribution of petitions and cases across regions,
giving each group between 300 and 400 ongoing petitions and cases.223
This arrangement enabled, in theory, attorneys within each regional
group to specialize based on their seniority. Junior professionals were
responsible for admissibility reports and senior professionals for merits
reports.224 A senior specialist would coordinate and oversee the regional
group.225 The regional sections would process petitions and cases,
assess the observations by the parties, determine the need for additional
215. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 13; see also id. arts. 30, 37.
216. Id. arts. 26−27, 29.
217. Comm. on Jur. and Pol. Affairs, Permanent Council of the Organization of American
States, Reorganization of the Executive Secretariat of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, CP/CAJP-2693/09 rev. 1 (Feb. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Reorganization].
218. Id.
219. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 55.
220. Reorganization, supra note 217.
221. Id. at 1−2.
222. Id. at 1.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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information, and recommend the convening of hearings when
necessary.226 These sections would also follow up on recommendations
made by the Commission.227
The Commission’s Secretariat created the Registry in March 2007,
in order to address the large backlog of new petitions.228 As of October
2008, the Secretariat transferred to this unit all of its new petitions
waiting to be reviewed—a total of 4,471 petitions.229 Currently, the
Registry reviews all new petitions in addition to the backlogged new
petitions in chronological order.230 Thanks to additional funding from
external sources to create the Registry, the Commission hired new staff
and reallocated personnel from other stages of the case system process.
The Commission’s plan was to reduce the delay in the initial stage by
concentrating resources in the Registry for the first three years, and then
once a more reasonable delay was achieved, the resources would be
allocated elsewhere.231
The Secretariat has recently created the Friendly Settlement Group,
a specialized unit that will support Commissioners assigned to cases
where the parties have agreed to enter into friendly settlement
procedures.232 The Group will be in charge of tracking and facilitating
the process, preparing the necessary reports, and providing general
assistance to the Commissioners.233 Unfortunately, the Commission was
only able to supply “rough estimates” of seventy to one hundred cases
and petitions currently in friendly settlement negotiations.234 This raises
concerns for planning and managing the status of each case and petition.
It is particularly problematic for the Commission when forecasting the
need for staff and resources.235 Friendly settlements increase efficiency

226. Comm. on Jur. and Pol. Affairs, Permanent Council of the Organization of American
States, Reorganization of the Executive Secretariat of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, CP/CAJP-2693/09 rev. 1 (Feb. 20, 2009).
227. The Executive Secretariat also created a protection group to deal with precautionary
measures. The protection group studies requests for precautionary measures and analyzes their
necessity before making the pertinent recommendations to the Commission. Additionally, it
handles the processing of those precautionary measures and follows up with the petitioner and the
State after the measures have been requested.
228. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 56.
229. Id. at 20.
230. Id. at 56.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 59.
233. Id. at 60.
234. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF TEXAS SCH. OF LAW, MAXIMIZING JUSTICE,
MINIMIZING DELAY: STREAMLINING PROCEDURES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
60
(2011),
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_Justice_Minimizing_Delay_at
_the_IACHR.pdf
235. Id.
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by dealing with cases (or petitions) at earlier stages. Our data indicates
that the average time between filing and settlement approval was almost
five months shorter than the average time between filing and merits
decisions, and almost two years shorter than the average time between
filing and receiving a decision from the Court.236 Additionally, friendly
settlements increase the effectiveness of the Commission. In a study of
compliance with decisions in the Inter-American System, 54% of
friendly settlements had total compliance by States, while only 29% of
Court decisions and 11% of Commission reports were fully complied
with.237 Additionally, like any method of alternative dispute resolution,
friendly settlements can be more flexible than Commission and Court
decisions.238
The Secretariat has also implemented a variety of technological
changes. In 2002 the Secretariat created the Petition and Case
Management System (PCMS).239 The PCMS is an electronic database
that tracks the progress of petitions and cases by making an electronic
record for every procedural step, starting with the submission of a
petition.240 The PCMS standardizes all of the communications between
the Commission and the parties in petitions or cases by producing predetermined letters.241
In May 2010 the Secretariat began using an electronic Document
Management System (DMS) to track and file documents in the same
way that it manages petitions and cases.242 The DMS digitizes and
registers documents filed by either a party or the Commission, and it
links the documents to the appropriate petition or case.243 The DMS
eliminates the need to use paper by creating a fully electronic file for
each petition or case, and by facilitating access to the documents within
each file. The DMS facilitates oversight and monitoring by giving
managers electronic access to pertinent documents for each stage of a
petition or case.244 The DMS is limited to petitions and documents filed

236. Id.
237. Basch, supra note 137.
238. Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, Special Working Group to
Reflect on the Workings of the IACHR With a View to Strengthening the IAHRS, OEA/Ser.G
GT/SIDH/INF 41/11 (Dec. 2011) (presentation by the Executive Secretariat of the IACHR on
“Friendly Settlements”).
239. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 57.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 58.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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after June 2010, and there are currently no plans or resources to digitize
earlier-filed documents.245
The Executive Secretariat hopes to implement a “user portal”
(”PPP”) that would initially allow States and parties to monitor the
progress of their petition or case and view related documents.246 The
eventual goal is to provide all petitioners and States access to
information in the database that relates to their petition or case.247 The
PPP offers the possibility of digitally notifying petitioners and States of
IACHR decisions.248
The Secretariat also has a process whereby petitions can be
submitted online.249 After registering with the Commission’s website,
petitioners can complete a petition by filling out the online form.250
Upon submitting this form, petitioners immediately receive an
automated follow-up email that simultaneously confirms the receipt of
the electronic petition and requests the petitioner to mail a signed copy
of the form.251 There are no public records of the number of new
petitions submitted online.252

245. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF TEXAS SCH. OF LAW, MAXIMIZING JUSTICE,
MINIMIZING DELAY: STREAMLINING PROCEDURES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
58
(2011),
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_Justice_Minimizing_Delay_at
_the_IACHR.pdf
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See
Petition
Form,
Inter-Am.
Comm’n
H.R.,
available
at
https://www.cidh.oas.org/cidh_apps/instructions.asp?gc_language=E.
250. Id.
251. See
Register,
Inter-Am.
Comm’n
H.R.,
available
at
https://www.cidh.oas.org/cidh_apps/register.asp.
252. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 58. However, the Commission’s answers have
provided its calculation. As of August 30, 2011, of a total of 1,030 petitions received, 308 have
been received through the online formula (33%). The Commission estimates through a sampling
of 100 consecutive petitions from which online petitions were withdrawn, that 37 were presented
by e-mail. Using the Commission’s own formula, they estimate this to be 37% of petitions being
received through e-mail translating to, “roughly 55%” of petitions received during the year being
through electronic means. Id.
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VI.
V ADDITIONA
AL EXPLANAT
TIONS FOR TH
HE CURRENT SITUATION
Seeveral additio
onal contribu
uting factors explain the current backklog
and delays. The main
m
problem
m is a lack oof funding. S
Specifically, the
OAS has not provid
ded a proporrtional allocaation of addittional resourrces
to matcch the increaased demand of new petiitions, new m
mandates by the
OAS, and
a growing tasks carried out by thee IACHR.253 The OAS ddoes
not app
pear to be interested
i
in
n securing prroper fundinng for its m
main
human rights body
y, so it is easy to undderstand the Commissioon’s
difficullty dealing with
w petitionss and cases iin an efficient manner. T
The
OAS iss responsiblee for creating
g a situationn beyond thee Commissioon’s
control.

Th
he underfund
ding of the Commission is a permanennt and structuural
problem
m that has affected thee IACHR froom its veryy first years of
operatio
on.254 The Commission
C
has continuually tried too deal with its
253. Id.
I at 21−25.
254. Id.
I at 21. In 1970
0 it was said thatt the Commissionn’s “small budgeet is a . . . substaantial
limit on its autonomy. . . . [The] limiteed budget restriccts the Commisssion’s ability to hire
specializeed personnel and makes it difficullt to engage in sppecial operations””. ANNA SCHREIIBER,
THE INTE
ER-AM’N COMM
M’N ON H.R. 42 (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1970). See also Inter--Am.
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persistent lack of financial resources by seeking additional external
funding.255 Indeed, in 2010 the Commission had a budget of just over $7
million, with $3.4 million from donations and $4 million from the
OAS.256
The $4 million provided by the OAS only represented five of the
total OAS 2010 Program Budget.257 The IACHR increased its external
funding in 2007 and 2008.258 However, the global financial crisis has
had an impact on the Commission’s ability to secure external funding.
In 2010 member states donated approximately $500,000 less than in
2009, with the United States reducing its funding by over $1,000,000.259
In 2010, Canada was the biggest donor followed by the European
Union.260
Contributions by member states produce an apparent conflict of
interest for the Commission, which must decide cases impartially with
respect to those member states.261 Also, the funds from outside of the
OAS budget are voluntary contributions, which depend on the priorities
and financial abilities of funders, two factors that are variable.262
Additionally, outside organizations and governments tend to commit
new funds to special projects, rather than the core functions of the
Commission, particularly the processing of petitions and cases.263 These
targeted funds have created several political problems to the

Comm’n H.R., IACHR Annual Report 1976, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.40, doc. 5, at ch. 1.D (June 7, 1977)
(“The work of the Commission has been increasing in volume and in intensity due to the constant
increase of denunciations of violations of human rights in various regions in the hemisphere and,
as was already pointed out elsewhere, that increase in the work load has not been accompanied by
a proportional enlargement of the means for handling it. The Commission still is limited to the
staff and resources that it had several years ago.”).
255. STRATEGIC PLAN PART I, supra note 105, at 61.
256. Financial
Resources
2010,
Inter-Am.
Comm'n
H.R.,
available
at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2010eng/2010.Contributions.to.IACHR_certified.pdf.
257. Id.
258. See Financial Resources 2008, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/pdf%20files/Participation%20of%20IACHR%20in%20the%202008
%20OAS%20Budget_english.pdf. See also Financial Resources 2007, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/recursos2007.eng.htm.
259. Id.
260. Financial Resources 2010, supra note 258. In 2010, of the $1,267,500 contributed by
Member States, $748,600 was funded by Canada. The USA contributed the second highest
amount, $400,000, while Colombia contributed $105,000, and Chile contributed $10,000. Finally,
Costa Rica contributed $3,900 to the Commission. A large portion of the funding—$1,154,900—
came from observer States, $700,400 of which came from Spain. The European Commission and
other institutions, such as UNICEF and the Inter-American Development Bank, also contributed a
significant portion.
261. James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional Human Rights
Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court, 102 AM. J. INT’L
L. 768, 783 (2008).
262. Id.
263. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28.
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Commission as it has being accused of focusing only on the agenda and
interests of some funders (particularly of some States) and prioritizing
only some issues.264 More importantly, as the last couple of years show,
this additional funding may not be sustainable.265
As a result of underfunding, the Commission cannot hire the
necessary staff.266 Currently the Commission has thirty-seven
professionals and eighteen administrative staff.267 Nevertheless, the
Executive Secretary has said that “in order to have a healthy and strong
system of individual cases that functions [. . .] on a timely basis, a total
of 87 professionals and 25 administrative assistants are needed.”268
Moreover, over 50% of the Commission’s staff is currently financed by
external cooperation funds.269
In addition to the lack of resources, there are difficulties within the
Commission’s process that contribute to the delays and backlog. First,
the Commission does not use its online petition system to its full
potential. If a petitioner submits an online petition, he or she still must
submit a signed paper copy. On some occasions, the Executive
Secretariat registers these multiple submissions separately and with
inconsistent dates in the Commission’s reports.270 If the petition is
264. See for instance the position of Ecuador. OAS, Permanent Council, Working Group,
Proposals by the Delegation of Ecuador, Doc. OEA/Ser.G/GT/SIDH/INF.46/11 (Dec. 5, 2011)
(proposing that the OAS finance the Commission from its own resources, and until this goal is
achieved, the Commission should establish a policy that voluntary contributions it receives cannot
be conditioned or earmarked and that the Commission should correct the imbalance of economic
and human resources in its rapporteurships). See also OAS, General Assembly, Resolution
Results of the Process of Reflection on the Workings of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights with a View to Strengthening the Inter-American Human Rights System, AG/RES.
1 (XLIV-E/13) corr. 1 (adopted at the plenary session, held on Mar. 22, 2013 and subject to
revision by the Style Committee) (inviting member states, observer states, and other institutions
to continue making voluntary contributions, preferably not earmarked). See generally, RuizChiriboga, Oswaldo R., Is Ecuador That Wrong?: Analyzing the Ecuadorian Proposals
Concerning the Special Rapporteurship on Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, 20 HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 2 (2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2034375 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2034375.
265. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28. For instance in 2008, the IACHR received
$5,045,000 in voluntary contributions. Five years later, in 2012, the contributions were reduced to
$3,982,600. In 2011, the voluntary contributions rose to their pick in 2011 amounting $5,135,200.
But in 209 and 2010 they suffered a sharp decrease as they were only $4,329,800 and $3,354,700
respectively. See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Financial Resources, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/financial_resources.asp.
266. Id. at 22.
267. Inter-Am.
Comm’n
H.R.,
Composition
of
the
IACHR
2010,
http://www.cidh.oas.org/personal.eng.htm.
268. Presentation of the Executive Sec’y, supra note 120, at 7.
269. Id. at 5.
270. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Costa Rica, Petition No. 12.136, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 97/10, ¶¶ 1, 4 (July 12, 2010), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/casos/10.eng.htm. (“On
May 12, 1998, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights received a petition presented by
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registered multiple times, then valuable resources are wasted as lawyers
may begin to process a petition twice, duplicating the intake process.
Even if the petition were not registered twice, the Commission would
still need to read all the different and subsequent versions to be sure that
they are the same. The advantage of an online system is that the
Commission automatically has a digital version of the petition, reducing
processing time.271 Of course, due to the lack of universal Internet
access throughout the Americas, a purely online system cannot for the
time being be fully implemented as it would limit access to the IACHR
for some people.
The current petition intake system encourages too many petitions
that cannot be processed. Information on how to file a petition is
publicly available in a new brochure and on the Commission’s website;
however, it is limited to the Rules, contains some legalistic
explanations, and does not provide enough specific examples of what
could be processed by the Commission and what claims are manifestly
outside of its jurisdiction.272 This lack of more user-friendly information
may account for some of the almost 90% of petitions summarily
dismissed by the Executive Secretariat.273 The backlog of petitions
waiting for initial review largely consists of petitions that are
insufficient to pass through the pre-screening phase, preventing
legitimate claims from receiving the Commission and its Secretariat’s
attention.274
The way by which petitioners and States submit information and
evidence contributes to the delays.275 Currently, petitioners submit
evidence with the initial petition. They may later submit additional
information to meet the requirements of the Rules, pursuant to Article
26.2, and may even later submit additional information and evidence in
written form or via a hearing, pursuant to Article 30.5.276 Once the case
is opened, the petitioner can submit another set of observations and
evidence (this time on the merits of the case, under Article 37.1), and
later the petitioner has yet one last opportunity to present evidence by

Seguismundo Gerardo Porras Jiménez . . . [t]he petition was received by the IACHR on August
27, 1998.”).
271. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 39.
272. Sistema De Peticiones Y Casos: Folleto Inforativo [System of Petitions and Cases:
Information Brochure], ORGANIZACIÓN DE ESTADOS AMERICANOS, available at
http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/docs/folleto/CIDHFolleto_esp.pdf.
273. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 40.
274. In 2010, a total of 1676 petitions were evaluated, with only 275 receiving a decision to
process (deemed receivable). Annual Report 2010, supra note 106, at 33 (chart e).
275. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 40.
276. Id.
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request of the Commission (Article 37.4).277 Likewise, the State presents
its information and evidence on admissibility to the Commission after
the IACHR initially transfers the petition to the State.278 The State has a
second opportunity to present evidence in writing or in hearing,279 a
third chance to submit additional observations on the merits,280 and a
fourth opportunity to present evidence in a hearing.281
In addition to all these explicit procedures afforded by the Rules,
the Commission may request or permit States and petitioners to submit
information and evidence at multiple stages, beyond what the Rules
require.282 For instance, in the Mateo Bruno petition, in the admissibility
stage alone, petitioners submitted eight briefs and the State filed nine
briefs with impressive gaps and silences in between.283 Petitioners did
not submit anything between November 1998 and May 2004 or between
July 2004 and May 2010.284 The State maintained silence between
February 1999 and September 2010.285
This practice might be encouraged or required by the current
backlog. Since petitions and cases are already waiting in docket,
requiring early submission of evidence may be seen as arbitrary.
Furthermore, after years of delays, part of the information and
arguments may become outdated as the factual situation of the case
evolves286 and Inter-American case law or practice develops. For
instance a law could be adopted or modified, a judicial case may have
been opened or concluded, or some State actions could have been
carried out.287 On the other hand, allowing late submissions of
information and evidence encourages parties to withhold information
that could reveal the strengths and weaknesses of their cases. Such
withholding might prevent the Commission from drafting reports earlier
277. Id.
278. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 30.3.
279. Id. art. 30.5.
280. Id. art. 30.7.
281. Id. art. 65.
282. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 40.
283. Bruno v. Peru, Petition No. 10.949, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 69/11, ¶ 5
(2011).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. OAS Working Group, supra note 15, at 3. The OAS Working Group recommended the
Commission to “[p]rovide factual updates on initial petitions that are transmitted to states a
considerable time after registration or in the event of long periods of procedural inactivity.” Id.
287. For example, in the Yean and Bossico case, the State, after three years of procedures in
front
of
the
Commission,
granted
the
birth
certificates to the children, one of the main complaints in the case. The Yean and Bosico Children
v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130, ¶ 25 (Sept. 8, 2005).
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and, in some situations, from encouraging parties to enter into friendly
settlement negotiations.288
Most of the time, the Commission acts passively, transmitting
communications between the parties back and forth rather than
managing the process.289 In those communications, the IACHR
mechanically requires additional information when both parties may
have already submitted all the factual documentation and fully
presented their legal arguments.290
The Commission is also inconsistent in its use of rules that may
speed up the process.291 For example, amended Article 36.3, which
allows the Commission to combine the decisions on admissibility and
merits in exceptional circumstances, is not consistently applied and it is
unclear why it is applied in some cases and not others.292 For example,
in 2010, the Commission decided two Brazilian cases in which the
Government had not presented any allegations challenging the
admissibility of the petitions. Nevertheless, the Commission took
absolutely opposite approaches in dealing with those two cases. Petition
12.308 was filed with the Commission on May 22, 2000. Ten months
later, on March 22, 2001, petition 12.378 was filed. In both cases, the
State did not respond to the petition. On March 17, 2010, the
Commission adopted Report 37/10, on the admissibility and merits of
petition/case 12.308. In that case, due to the silence of the State, the
Commission decided to join the admissibility to the merits of the case.
Two weeks earlier, on March 3, 2010, the Commission declared Petition
12.378 admissible. Even though the State was equally silent in this
petition, the Commission did not join the admissibility to the merits
without explaining this inconsistency.293
The Commission does not provide any written explanation for
most of its procedural decisions.294 The lack of publicly reasoned

288. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 41.
289. Id. at 68.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Amended Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 36.4.
293. See Manoel Leal de Oliveira v. Brazil, Case No. 12.308, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 37/10 ( 2010), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/casos/10.eng.htm; Fátima Regina
Nascimento de Oliveira and Maura Tatiane Ferreira Alves v. Brazil, Petition No. 12.378, InterAm.
Comm’n
H.R.,
Report
No.
7/10,
¶
14
(2010),
available
at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/casos/10.eng.htm.
294. The Commission does not publicly state the reasons for convening or denying a hearing
nor the reasons for calling witnesses or the purpose of their testimonies. This is a contrast with the
practice of the Court. See, e.g., Liakat Ali Alibux v. Suriname, Provisional Measures, Order of the
President of the Court (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Dec. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/asuntos/Liakat.pdf.

2013]

Too Little, Too Late

173

decisions regarding procedural issues295 is a persistent obstacle in
evaluating and understanding the Commission’s process. For instance,
the Commission stated that it now deals with petitions and cases in
chronological order, but some petitions and cases receive priority and
are put in a fast track.296 The Commission has established that it should
give priority status to 10% of new petitions and immediately evaluate
them.297 Nevertheless, there is no public document discussing how the
Commission decides to give priority to certain petitions or cases over
others.298 The Commission explained that in order to understand or
identify the criteria, one needs to look to individual cases already
decided as a guide.299 While this may be possible for certain aspects of
the procedure and certain users of the System, for many petitioners,

295. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 42. Besides the admissibility and merits reports
themselves.
296. Id. at 43.
297. STRATEGIC PLAN PART II, supra note 162, at 75.
298. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 43. In the recent 2013 revised Rules, the
Commission corrected this problem. Under revised Article 29.2:
The petition shall be studied in the order it was received; however, the
Commission may expedite the evaluation of a petition in situations such as
the following:
a. when the passage of time would deprive the petition of its
effectiveness, in particular:
i. when the alleged victim is an older person or a
child;
ii. when the alleged victim is terminally ill;
iii. when it is alleged that the death penalty could be
applied to the presumed victim; or
iv. when the object of the petition is connected to a
precautionary or provisional measure in effect;
b. when the alleged victims are persons deprived of liberty;
c. when the State formally expresses its intention to enter into a
friendly settlement process in the matter; or
d. when any of the following circumstances are present:
i. the decision could have the effect of repairing serious
structural situations that would have an impact in the
enjoyment of human rights; or
ii. the decision could promote changes in legislation or
state practices and avoid the reception of multiple
petitions on the same matter.
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Consultation 2013 on Module I: Draft Reform of the Rules, art. 29.2
(2013), available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/consultation2013/1_rules.asp#29 [hereinafter
Draft Reform of Rules].
299. Commission’s Answers, supra note 58. The OAS Working Group recommended the
Commission to “[c]ontinue to develop objective criteria for setting priorities regarding treatment
of petitions and other cases, considering the nature, complexity, and impact of the alleged
situations.” OAS Working Group, supra note 15, at 3.A.h.
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such a wealth of documentation would be overwhelming.300 What
published reports are available do not provide information on basic
questions such as why the Commission granted extensions, requested
additional information, or decided not to join the admissibility with the
merits. Moreover, existing published reports do not explain the
procedural decisions made in the thousands of petitions and cases in the
Commission’s docket.301
With very few exceptions302 there are no deadlines for the adoption
of any of the Commission’s decisions.303 As a quasi-judicial body, the
Commission needs to have flexibility in the way and order in which it
processes petitions to accommodate the needs of the victims, encourage
State engagement and cooperation, facilitate friendly settlements, and
strengthen the possibilities of the IACHR’s impact. Strict procedural
deadlines or a ritualistic management of its procedure could hamper its
effectiveness.304 But reasonable timeliness, consistency and
transparency should not necessarily mean losing its flexibility.305
The procedures set up in the Convention require the cooperation of
the State to resolve cases. There is a mechanism that is designed to
encourage the State to settle the matter before it is brought to the
Court.306 Most of the procedures before the IACHR depends on “the
willingness of the government to cooperate in the investigation and to
take the necessary steps to resolve it.”307 The IACHR has used its

300. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 43.
301. Claudio Grossman, Strengthening the Intra-American Human Rights System: The
Current Debate, 92 Proc. Ann. Meetings (Am. Soc’y Int’l. L.) 186, 188 (1998). (explaining that
the Commission does not have a transparent system to grant hearings, admit cases for processing
or follow up initiated submissions. Equally, there are currently no deadlines for the Commission
to review the admissibility or merits of any given case. As a result, petitioners often do not know
the procedural status of their claims which, in turn, affects their opportunity to be competently
and timely represented.)
302. “If the friendly settlement referred to in Articles 44-51 of the Convention is not reached,
the Commission shall draft, within 180 days, the report required by Article 50 of the
Convention.” Commission Statute, supra note 50, art. 23.2. But even this explicit deadline is
routinely ignored by the Commission. See, e.g., Juan José López, Case 11.395 Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 73/11, ¶ 9 (2011) (stating that on May 17, 2001, the State reported that it was
unable to find grounds for commencing friendly settlement proceedings, and it reiterated that
communication on July 10, 2001. The IACHR approved the merits report ten years later).
303. See OAS Comm. on Jur. and Pol. Affairs Results, CP/CAJP 2665/08 rev. 8 corr. 3 (Mar.
18 2009) at 11[hereinafter OAS Results] (finding that “the IACHR Rules of Procedure do not
provide for any deadlines to be met by the IACHR in the initial processing, admissibility, or
merits phases”; that the current lack of deadlines “may generate legal uncertainty among all
players” and it is “one of many reasons for delays in issuing rulings” and finally that the
“uncertainty regarding deadlines undermines the legitimacy of and confidence in the system.”).
304. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 43.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 65.
307. Velasquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, ¶ 60.
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procedures flexibly while trying to obtain State cooperation.308 The
flexibility of IACHR procedures has allowed the IACHR to engage in
productive dialogue with governments, even in the darkest days of the
region.309 By leveraging the shifting degrees of intensity applied at
various stages of the procedure, and diplomacy outside the strict limits
of the procedure, the Commission has sought, and quite often achieved,
cooperation from reluctant States to solve specific situations.310
For instance, in 1995, in the Villatina massacre case, the parties
initiated the process to reach a friendly settlement.311 For almost three
years, the Commission facilitated the establishment of the Committee to
Promote the Administration of Justice, for this and other cases, and
created a follow-up committee to monitor the recommendations made
by the promotion committee.312 As part of this process, in 1998, the
Colombian President acknowledged the State had international
responsibility for the massacre and “handed to the families of each
victim a document as a testimony of moral redress and atonement.”313
Nevertheless, the parties decided to terminate the friendly settlement
process because the Government failed to comply with most of the
agreements.314 The Commission continued to process the case and on
November 16, 2001, approved a preliminary merits report and notified
the State.315
In February 2002, in view of the IACHR’s recommendations, a
new Colombian Government expressed its willingness to start up new
talks with the petitioners.316 The Commission let the parties engage with
each other once again despite the fact that the Rules do not contemplate
a friendly settlement at this stage of the process, and that Article 50 of
the Convention presupposes the failure of the friendly settlement
process.317 In the end, on July 29, 2002, the parties signed a very
comprehensive friendly settlement agreement.318 The flexibility and

308. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 65.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Villatina Massacre, Friendly Settlement, Case 11.141, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No.
105/05,
rev.
¶
6
(2005),
available
at
http://cidh.org/annualrep/2005eng/Colombia11141eng.htm.
312. Id.
313. Id. ¶ 8.
314. Id. ¶ 9.
315. Id. ¶ 10.
316. Id. ¶ 11.
317. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 50 (stating that “if a settlement is not reached,
the Commission shall . . . draw up a report setting forth the facts and stating its conclusions.”)
(emphasis added).
318. Villatina Massacre, Friendly Settlement, ¶¶ 3−12.
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willingness of the Commission to go around and beyond the text of the
Convention and its own Rules allowed the parties to settle a matter with
a far-reaching agreement. Although the process took seven years to
conclude, it allowed the Commission to reengage with a new
Government and, crucially, secure integral reparations for the victims.319
The one negative consequence of the Commission’s flexibility is
that States have taken advantage of their situational cooperation with the
Commission. The treatment of the procedure as a flexible framework,
rather than a clear set of rules, has had a negative impact on many cases
and hindered the rights of victims to obtain a timely decision, resulting
in high levels of procedural uncertainty.
VII. BACKLOG, DELAYS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS
AND EFFICIENCY OF THE COMMISSION
The Commission needs to find a proper balance between
effectiveness and efficiency in order to deal with its backlog and
procedural delays. While the Commission’s effectiveness could be
hampered by not processing enough complaints within a reasonable
amount of time, a more efficient adjudication process cannot be
achieved at the expense of the Commission’s overall effectiveness.
In order to analyze whether a proper balance has been struck, the
goals of the Commission need to be identified. The IACHR’s goals
offer the framework by which it is possible to evaluate and measure
efficiency and efficacy. The different perspectives through which the
effectiveness of an intergovernmental human rights mechanism can be
analyzed reflect the different conceptions of the goals of such a
system.320 It is not possible to argue whether or not the Commission is
effective without some baseline or reference to measure its effectiveness
against.
Thus, in order to assess the effectiveness of a system, including the
Inter-American, one has to identify its aims or goals—the desired
319. Luis Manuel Lasso-Lozano, Algunas reflexiones sobre el trámite de soluciones
amistosas por parte de Colombia ante el Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos
Humanos, SIDH (1994–97), 18 Int’l Law, Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional, 89–116
(2011).
320. See also Centre of Human Rights Education (ZMRB) of the PHZ Lucerne, Report:
Lucerne Academic Consultation on Strengthening the United Nations Treaty Body System, 4
(2011) (stating that “while there may be many ways in which the system might be made more
‘efficient’ (e.g. [sic] by reducing the number of reports or limiting the scope of opportunities for
civil society engagement), such steps might not be appropriate if other goals (such as enhancing
opportunities for civil society engagement in reporting procedures) are viewed as important to the
system. Deciding which of the proposed changes should be pursued must involve measuring them
against the overall purposes of the system and asking whether they would be likely to promote
those purposes.”).
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outcomes that it ought to generate—“and ascertain a reasonable time
frame for meeting some or all of these goals.”321 In the leading study on
the effectiveness of supranational adjudication, Slaughter and Helfer
recognize that “defining effectiveness . . . inevitably requires asking the
question ‘effective for what purpose?’ - an inquiry that will in turn
depend on a prior conception of the functions of specific courts within
specific legal systems.”322 “These functions . . . may conflict with one
another; they may also each generate a different metric of
effectiveness.”323 From this perspective, Steiner discussing the “burst of
[human rights] commissions, committees and courts;” has inquired, for
example: “[W]hat purposes should such forms of international dispute
resolution between individuals and their state of nationality serve? What
goals should give direction to these innovative processes? Are there
generally valid answers to these . . . questions, or will answers
necessarily vary with context?”324
There are theoretical and practical challenges in attempting to
respond to these questions. The theoretical difficulty is that there has
been little analysis regarding the goals of human rights systems in
general and in the Inter-American system in particular.325 The practical
321. Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal Based
Approach, 106 AM. J. INT’L L., 225, 230 (2012).
322. Anne-Marie Slaughter & Laurence Helfer, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J., 273, 282 (1997).
323. Id. at 202 (stating that the definition of what effectiveness or success means appears to
be a controversial issue, not only in the sphere of human rights, but in international law in
general); David López, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early Experience,
32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 163, 200 (1997) (defining what constitutes "success" in the context of dispute
resolution under NAFTA is extremely controversial).
324. Henry Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What role for the
Human Rights Committee?, in THE FUTURE OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING
15, 16 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000). The references in this article to other human
rights bodies and courts are meant to provide ideas on how to frame these issues or think about
potential reform of the Commission’s procedure. As I discussed in the text, due to the unique
goals and functions of the Commission as a human rights body with multiple tasks, including
quasi-judicial adjudicatory tasks, and the context in which it operates, there are limitations to the
comparisons. I do not mention other Courts and bodies to measure the Commission’s
performance against them. On the contrary, the reference to other bodies is in part in order to
delineate and justify what would be the proper differences between the Commission and the other
bodies. The use of other bodies’ experiences is also intended to distinguish the way in which the
Commission’s procedural practices justifiably differ from other similar bodies. It is used to
highlight the peculiarities and strengths as well as the weaknesses of Commission Rules and
practices. See also Paolo Carozza, Advocacy Before Regional Human Rights Bodies: A CrossRegional Agenda, 59 AM. U.L. REV., 163, 215 (2008).
325. Davis and Werner had identified four purposes of an international court that hears
human rights cases from post-conflict democracies, including the Inter-American Court. First, it
should operate to deter future violations with rulings that equip people to call for accountability.
Second, it should facilitate the legal and moral condemnation of human rights violations. Third,
its jurisprudence should transcend the parties in the case in order to express the normative value
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difficulty is that there is no consensus among the different actors with
respect to those goals,326 and no attempt to identify them. In addition, as
with any international adjudicatory body, the Commission has diverse
goals that reflect the expectations of different internal and external
constituencies.327 This article emphasizes the Commission’s broader
mandate and its main goal is to promote and protect human rights.328
Thus, the Commission could only be effective if its case system
reflected and sought to achieve this larger aim. But as a body with
quasi-judicial, promotional, diplomatic, and political functions, the
IACHR tends to fulfill several different and specific goals that, at times,
could contradict each other. The way it designs and administers its case
system is informed, constrained and limited by all the different and
sometimes competing goals. Thus, the IACHR can be effective if its
case system advances most of its goals most of the time.
In its most limited way, effective adjudication could be defined in
terms of an adjudicatory body’s “ability to compel or cajole compliance
with its” decisions.329 In order to be effective, supranational tribunals
and quasi-judicial bodies in their adjudicatory role must ensure
compliance by convincing domestic governments to act in accord with
their rulings.330 Thus, as a starting and limited point, both the problems
of delay and backlog and the possible responses to them should be
considered in terms of their impact on the ability of the Commission to
compel compliance with its decisions in individual cases. In fact, the
only quantitative study on the level of compliance with decisions of the
Commission and the Court makes explicit references to the duration of
the procedure as a relevant factor to take into consideration.331 But, as
the Inter-American system in general, and the case system in particular,
has several different goals,332 compliance with its recommendations or

of justice and equality under the law to broad classes of victims. Fourth, it should establish
knowledge of past actions committed under color of law and create a historical record. Edward
Warner & Jeffery Davis, Reaching Beyond the State: Judicial Independence, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights and Accountability in Guatemala, J. HUM. RTS. 6, No. 2, 233–55 (2007).
326. See EL FUTURO, supra note 23, at 9 (stating there the System confronts an identity crisis
as there is a fundamental disagreement among the main actors on the current legal and political
direction of the System).
327. Shany, supra note 321, at 233.
328.American Convention, supra note 7, art. 41. “There shall be an Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, whose principal function shall be to promote the observance and
protection of human rights and to serve as a consultative organ of the Organization in these
matters.” OAS Charter supra note 49, art. 106.
329. Slaughter & Helfer, supra note 322, at 110.
330. Id.
331. Basch, supra note 137, at 26.
332. Lea Shaver, The Inter-American Human Rights System: An Effective Institution for
Regional Rights Protection?, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 639, 665 (2010). The
effectiveness of an international tribunal may be judged in several aspects, not all of which are
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with decisions of the Commission and Court is only one element to take
into consideration when assessing the System’s effectiveness.333
We believe that a human rights system would be effective if it is
able to achieve reasonable goals given the economic, social and political
setting within which it operates; the nature of the violations it has to
handle; and the powers granted in service of its supervisory function.334
The context sets not only the possibilities of the System but also
conditions its goals.335 In this regard, both to assess the effectiveness of
the Commission and the way in which it handles individual complaints,
there is a need to have some understanding of what goals the InterAmerican system seeks to meet by establishing an individual complaint
mechanism and the context in which operates.336
The goals of the Commission in its adjudicatory process337 are: i)
the protection of individuals,338 ii) raising awareness339 and serving as an

easily measured. In simple terms, a court's effectiveness may be measured by the number of cases
it resolves, and whether the orders that it issues are in fact followed. Ultimately, however, human
rights tribunals exist in large part to achieve much broader effects.
333. See Huneeus, supra note 1, at 505 (stating that implementation is not the only and
arguably not the most significant potential outcome of a court ruling). In fact, compliance is
distinct from, although related to, questions of effectiveness. For instance, international regimes
could have high rates of compliance with very low and ineffective standards. Par Engstrom,
Effectiveness of International and Regional Human Rights Regimes, THE INT’L STUDIES
ENCYCLOPEDIA 5 (Robert A. Denemark ed., 2010).
334. A. GLENN MOWER, JR., REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
WEST EUROPEAN AND INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEMS 164 (1991).
335. See Sergio Garcia Ramirez, Judge, Inter-Am. Ct. of H.R., Address at the Conference:
Advocacy Before Regional Human Rights Bodies: A Cross-Regional Agenda (Oct. 20, 2008)
(stating that it is not necessary to impose on each human rights system the rules and regulations of
the other, because each works within circumstances and conditions that are sometimes profoundly
different; the achievements of each system are within the circumstances of each).
336. Shany, supra note 321, at 231.
337. Steiner had speculated that the Human Rights Committee in its adjudicatory capacity
could serve any of all of three purposes associated with adjudicatory bodies in general: (a) doing
justice in the individual case; (b) protecting rights through deterrence and related behavior
modification; and (c) “expounding, elucidating, interpreting and explaining the Covenant so as to
engage Committee in an ongoing, fruitful dialogue with states parties, non-governmental and
intergovernmental institutions, advocates, scholars and students.” Steiner supra note 324, at 31.
Shany has identified four generic goals that all or almost international courts have been encourage
to achieve: 1. Promoting compliance with the governing international norms; 2. Resolving
international disputes and specific problems; 3. Contributing to the operation of related
institutional and normative regimes and 4. Legitimizing associated international norms and
institutions. Shany, supra note 321, at 244−46.
338. The American Declaration Preamble establishes that the “international protection of the
rights of man should be the principal guide of an evolving American Law.” Declaration, supra
note 44, at 1. Similarly, the Convention creates the Commission and the Court as “[m]eans of
Protection.” American Convention, supra note 7, at Part II. Therefore, the Court as well as the
Commission has an obligation to preserve all of the remedies that the Convention affords victims
of violations of human rights so that they are accorded the protection to which they are entitled
under the Convention. Gallardo et al. v. Costa Rica, Provisional Measures, Order of the President
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early warning system,340 iii) establishing human rights standards,341 iv)
creation of a democratic forum to discuss human rights issues342 and v)
of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. G, ¶ 15 (July 15, 1981). This could be the “official”
goal of the System as put forth in the official document that could be distinguished from the
operative goals of the System. Shany, supra note 321, at 231. See also Basch, supra note 137
(stating that the variety of the remedies adopted by the IACHR and the Inter-American Court
seems to confirm the widespread vision that the objectives sought by the Inter-American System
are, with relatively few exceptions, to make reparations to affected persons or groups and to give
protection to victims and witnesses). The International Coalition of Human Rights Organizations
of the Americas has stated that “the primary objective of the [system] is not to achieve an abstract
ideal of justice, but rather to guarantee protection of human dignity without distinction and to see
justice done for specific victims of human rights violations.” OAS Coalition Observations,
OAE/Ser.G CP/INF 6386/12 (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Coalition Observations]. But not all
agree with this position. For instance, in the African context it was argued that while the African
human rights court should protect individuals, it “should not be viewed as a forum for offering
individual justice to victims of human rights violations.” While such a goal is certainly noble, it is
by all means impossible.” Makau Mutua W., The African Human Rights Court: A Two-Legged
Stool?, 21 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 342–63, 361 (1999). In Europe, the discussion on how to
deal with the backlog crisis of the European Court has focused on whether the Court should
“provide ‘individual’ or ‘constitutional’ justice. Advocates of the former view argue that the right
of individual petition is the centerpiece of the [European system requiring the Court to hear every
case] and provide a remedy to every individual whose human rights have been violated.
Proponents of the [constitutional justice] position argue, [similar to Steiner’s position with regard
to the Human Rights Committee, that the European Court] should concentrate on providing ‘fully
reasoned and authoritative [decisions] in cases which raise substantial or new and complex issues
of human rights law, which are of particular significance for the State concerned or involve
allegations of serious human rights violations and which warrant a full process of considered
adjudication.’” Helfer supra note 22, at 127.
339. The Convention specifically provides that one of the activities of the IACHR is to
“develop an awareness of human rights among the peoples of America.” American Convention,
supra note 7, art. 41.1. See Tom J. Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime:
No Longer a Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 510, 524 (1997) (In the case system, this
goal could mean paying closer attention to cases representing structural problems or cases that
give visibility to traditionally marginalized issues or groups.).
340. See generally Santiago Canton, AMNESTY LAWS, IN VICTIMS UNSILENCED: THE INTERAMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA (2007)
(stating that “[t]he IACHR’s mandate to receive complaints of human rights violations has
enabled it . . . to acquire a detailed understanding of situations involving large-scale human rights
abuses. It can then take swift action to alert the international community about these situations.
Known as “early warning,” this is perhaps the most important function of the IACHR, as it
provides an avenue for timely intervention by the international community to prevent the
continuation of massive violations of human rights.”). See also Claudio Grossman, Strengthening
the Intra-American Human Rights System: The Current Debate, 92 Proc. Ann. Meetings, AM.
SOC’Y INT’L. L. 188 (1998) (indicating that “the case system’s approach is particularly effective
because it performs a preventive role and serves as an early-warning function: a single violation
could be the first indication of the beginning of a process that, if allowed to proceed, will result in
regression back to an authoritarian structure”.) For a similar argument in Europe, see Helfer,
supra note 22, at 129 (arguing that “national Governments established the Convention as an early
warning system to sound the alarm in case Europe’s fledgling democracies began to backslide
toward totalitarianism”).
341. See, e.g., Victor Abramovich, The Rights-Based Approach in Development Policies and
Strategies, 88 CEPAL REV. 33 (Apr. 2006) (arguing that the rulings by the Commission and the
Court “on a particular case have a heuristic value, as interpretations of the treaties by which
conflict should be governed, that transcends the particular cases of the immediate victims”). The
Inter-American case law serves as a guide for subsequent domestic rulings by national courts.
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legitimization of actors.343 Informed by these many goals, the processing
of individual complaints and the decisions that result produce ripple
effects, both in the domestic sphere and in the international system.
These effects are important in defining the goals of the Inter-American
system, assessing its effectiveness, and analyzing and dealing with its
delay and backlog. Not all effects or goals344 are solely, or even mainly,
tied to the degree of compliance with the IACHR’s decisions.
The Commission (and the Court) has “sought not only to
compensate the victims in individual cases” (which would require
compliance with their decisions), “but also to establish a body of
principles and standards, with the objective of influencing” domestic
democratic processes and strengthening national protection
mechanisms.345 The Commission’s (and Court’s) influence however,
does not limit itself to the impact of their jurisprudence on local courts.
The Commission (and the Court) pursues the processing and resolution
of individual cases, to persuade States to formulate policies to redress
the situation giving rise to each case, and to address the structural

For the African context, see Mutua arguing for the African Court to hear only those cases that
have the potential to expound on the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and make
law that would guide African States in developing legal and political cultures that respect human
rights. See also Mutua, supra note 338, at 362; Steiner, supra note 324, at 246 (with regard to the
Human Rights Committee).
342. See Harris, supra note 214, at 177. Many times the Inter-American System is the only
space where civil society organizations and governments can debate in safe conditions about
human rights and where the government is forced to listen and discuss human rights policies. The
processing of individual cases provides a space where a bilateral discussion occurs between the
petitioner and the State with the IACHR mediating the discussion between the parties. This
discussion will eventually provide the IACHR with the information required to adopt a resolution
if necessary or may permit the resolution of the case through friendly settlement. The
Commission is thus a platform upon which the struggle over human rights between and among
activists and States has played out. Engstrom, supra note 333, at 13.
343. As Cohen has said, “Many times, States argue that victims, witnesses, journalists and
human rights organizations are lying and cannot be believed because they have a political interest
in discrediting the government. If the source of the evidence can be shown to be suspect in any of
these ways, then the violations obviously did not take place or are being exaggerated.” Stanley
Cohen, Government Responses to Human Rights Reports: Claims, Denials, and Counterclaims,
18 HUM. RTS. Q. 517, 524 (1996). As the Commission studies each complaint with the same
degree of respect for the petitioners and gives the same degree of weigh to their arguments, the
process itself serves to give legitimacy to those actors. If the Commission, in addition, rules in
their favor, their legitimacy and credibility increases enormously.
344. I understand that goals and effects are not necessarily the same. I am conflating them in
this article for the purpose of showing that compliance with the decisions of the Commission is
too limited to analyze the effectiveness of the Commission and to show that the process is as
important as the outcome.
345. Victor Abramovich, From Massive Violations to Structural Patterns: New Approaches
and Classic Tensions in the Inter-American Human Rights System, SUR INT’L HUM. RTS. L.J., 7,
10 (2009).
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problems that are at the root of the conflict analyzed in the case.346 Thus,
most of those involved with the Inter-American system agree that a
crucial goal should be to enhance its domestic impact.347 Supranational
bodies will generally have the greatest impact when their procedures
and judgments are relevant to local actors.348 But even in this broader
sense, the importance of State compliance with the rulings of the
Commission (and the Court) cannot be denied.349
The processing of cases by the Commission (and also by the
Court) has gradually become a privileged arena of civil society
activism, producing innovative strategies that make use of the
international repercussion of those cases and situations they denounce.
Organizations use the IACHR and the processing of cases not only to
denounce violations and make visible certain questionable State
practices, but also to attain a measure of legitimacy that allows them to
dialogue with governments and their partners from a different status,
and to invert the power relationship, altering the dynamics of domestic
political processes.350 As such, the processing of cases by the
Commission (and not necessarily the final decision), even a lengthy one,
should be viewed as a space that could force, facilitate, and expand
social participation and legitimize social actors.351
I agree with Koh that transnational actors obey international law as
a result of repeated interaction with other actors in the transnational
legal process.352 Thus, “a first step is to empower more actors to
participate.”353 Transnational legal processes, including the
Commission’s case system, trigger those interactions.354 Interactions
between the Commission, government representatives, and
organizations strengthen the position of the victims as well.355 The cases
of the Commission demonstrate that in the international arena, the
process is as important as the outcome. As a process, the Commission
346. Id. at 12.
347. For the same argument with regard to the Court, see Cavallaro, supra note 261, at 2.
348. Id. at 770.
349. Huneeus, supra note 1, at 505.
350. See Par Engstrom & Andrew Hurrell, Why the Human Rights Regime in the Americas
matters, THE HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES IN THE AMERICAS: THEORY AND REALITY 37 (Monica
Serrano & Vesselin Popovski eds., 2010).
351. Abramovich, supra note 345, at 14.
352. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2656 (1997).
353. Id.
354. Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture Transnational Legal Process After
September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 337, 339 (2004).
355. Jorge Contesse, Constitucionalismo Interamericano: Algunas Notas Sobre Las
Dinámicas de Creación e Internalización de Los Derechos Humanos, in EL DERECHO EN
AMERICA LATINA: UN MAPA PARA EL PENSAMIENTO JURÍDICO DEL SIGLO XXI 251, 267 (Cesar
Rodriguez Garavito ed., 2012).
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provides a forum in which argumentation takes place. It provides a key
meeting place and arena for the mobilization of consensus and a site for
the battle of justifications.356 The IACHR contributes, in this sense, to
shifts in how government actors understand problems and attempt to
deal or justify them.357
Additionally, the processing of cases by the Commission
contributes to what Helfer has named “diffuse embeddedness”358 and
fulfills part of the socializing functions that international institutions can
exert over the behavior of national actors.359 That the Commission can
exert influence over the behavior of national decision-makers does not
rest on its coercive power, but rather in the “the skillful [sic] use of
persuasion to realign the interests and incentives of decision-makers in
favour of compliance” with the Commission’s decisions.360
Finally, interaction with the System may affect the relative power
of sectors within the government that deal with human rights issues.
Operating within the System, and having to justify the State’s official
policies in terms of the System’s discourse while remaining engaged
with other actors (particularly domestic human rights groups), fosters
this socialization process.361 Thus, the authority of the decisions and the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American System, and particularly of the
Commission, depends in part on its social legitimacy and on the
existence of a community of engaged actors who interact but also
monitor and disseminate the System’s decisions and standards. In the
processing of cases, the Commission should be aware of the political
processes of involved States at key moments. The IACHR also needs to
support and enhance the community of social, political and academic
actors who consider themselves protagonists in the evolution of the
Inter-American System and who participate actively in the processing of
cases and/or in the national implementation of its decisions and
principles.362

356. Alejandro Anaya Muñoz, The role of international Regimes in the constitution of State
behavior and identity: the case of contemporary Mexico, Special Edition, REVUE QUEBECOISE DE
DROIT INT’L, (Special Edition) 38, 44 (2011).
357. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 638 (2004).
358. Helfer, supra note 22, at 135.
359. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 357, at 635−38.
360. Helfer, supra note 22, at 135.
361. Engstrom & Hurrell, supra note 350, at 39.
362. For instance, legislators who may need to draft new or amend existing legislation;
prosecutors who may need to open or continue criminal investigations; journalists who may
disseminate the decisions of the IACHR or law professors who analyze, criticize, support and/or
teach those decisions.
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From this perspective, the Commission’s processes and the
decisions it renders are equally important. The Commission should
develop procedures that increase the relevance of its cases to domestic
(and in some cases, international) movements that are working to
eliminate the structural causes of human rights violations. It should
design a system that facilitates access, legitimization, and dialogue. In
that sense, the Court has been criticized for certain counterproductive
measures it has adopted, such as reducing the number of witnesses who
appear in person at Court hearings or reducing the number of days for
public hearings in each case.363 While those measures reduced the
length of the Court’s procedure, the outcome was achieved at the
expense of space for public advocacy.364 This critique shows the
connection between process, outcome and implementation. The IACHR
should be careful in the design and administration of a procedure that is
perceived as legitimate by all the actors involved. If the Commission
acts and processes cases in a way that is perceived as illegitimate, the
possibility of States acting according to the IACHR’s recommendations
will be lower.365
The conception of the processing of cases as a space for
transnational socialization, together with the different goals that the
Commission pursues in general and in processing individual complaints
in particular, could give rise to very different and perhaps directly
contradictory suggestions as to whether and how to speed up the
adjudicative mechanism.366 From this perspective, it should be
determined when the processing of cases and petitions requires
expediency, some degree of delay, or some balance of the two.367 In the
context of international criminal tribunals, time and delay can be
essential to successful prosecutions, and expediency in war crimes
prosecutions is not always possible, or even desirable.368 If societies
coming out of civil wars are not ready to seek justice in the immediate
aftermath of such traumatic events, the passing of time may open
possibilities for the arrest or prosecution of those accused of committing
363. Cavallaro, supra note 261, at 770.
364. Id. at 781, 799. See Helfer, supra note 22, at 136 for a description of how a procedural
tool such as the pilot judgment serves the purpose of increasing the dialogue between the
European Court and National Parliaments.
365. Cavallaro, supra note 261, at 775; see generally THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF
LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (Oxford Univ. Press 1990) (arguing that the more legitimate
international institutions appear to be and function in the eyes of States, the greater is their
capacity to secure compliance with its decisions).
366. Similarly, in the context of international criminal justice, see Galbraith, supra note 26 at
82.
367. See Whiting, supra note 25 at 326 (nothing the similarity in the context of international
criminal justice).
368. Id.
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international crimes.369 The same reasoning could be applicable to the
Commission in certain circumstances. The IACHR consistently
recommends identification, prosecution and punishment of those
responsible for grave human rights violations.370
More broadly, the timetable of processing cases does not
necessarily coincide with political momentum. Therefore, advocates
need to at least recognize this dissociation between decisions and
impacts. Advocates need to be able to advocate for their cases only
when the political moment in the country offer, at least in theory, the
best chances of effective international pressure by means of a decision
of the Commission. 371
Achieving the goal of protecting individuals requires State
cooperation, participation, and engagement. To facilitate State
involvement, the Commission may need to provide more time and
opportunity for States to respond, rather than handling a decision
without the State buying in. Similarly, a flexible procedure and flexible
management of the procedure gives States an opportunity to rectify the
situations that occasioned the complaints. A flexible procedure that
allows for fluid discussion between the parties enhances the probability
of compliance with the final decision.372
As one of the goals of the petition system is to promote dialogue
between petitioners and the State, the Commission has had to grant
leeway with deadlines to provide States with sufficient time to answer
complaints. The individual complaint mechanism could occasionally
run against the idea of a speedy processing of petitions as the timing of
a policy discussion and of the processing of a case are not necessarily
the same. Repetitive briefs, multiple hearings, and working meetings
may be required even if they delay the final decision.373

369. Id.
370. See, e.g., Manoel Leal de Oliveira, Case 12.308, (recommending the State to “conduct a
thorough, impartial, and effective investigation into the events, so as to identify and punish all of
the material and intellectual authors of the murder”).
371. James L. Cavallaro & Emily J. Schaffer, Less as More: Rethinking Supranational
Litigation of Economic and Social Rights in the Americas, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 217, 251 (2005).
372. Michael Cosgrove, Protecting the Protectors: Preventing the Decline of the InterAmerican System for the Protection of Human Rights, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 39, 48–49
(2000).
373. See for instance the Correa Belisle case that involved a challenge to the Argentine
Military Code of Justice. The petition was submitted in 1997, the parties reached, after long
negotiations, an agreement in 2006, but Congress modified the Code only in 2007 and the
Commission adopted a report in 2010. Rodolfo Luis Correa Belisle, Petition No. 11.758, InterAm. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 15/10 (Mar. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2010eng/ARSA11758EN.doc.
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Of course, a dialogue that occurs several years, or even decades,
after the alleged human rights violation took place could be, in many
instances, completely irrelevant. In the intervening years and decades,
the victims, witnesses, and perpetrators may have died. The harm may
have been exacerbated. Governments and regimes may have changed.
Given the likelihood of these occurrences, how could the goal to
promote dialogue be served if the Commission decides a case ten or
fifteen years after the violation happened?374
Like any organization, the Commission may be effective in
fulfilling all or most of its goals but still be inefficient by generating
considerable costs and negative externalities.375 Similarly, the
Commission may be efficient in acting expeditiously but ineffective if it
fails to meet its goals.376 Thus, the delays and backlog of the
Commission should be understood in light of the different
Commission’s goals. The design and administration of a speedy
adjudicatory process should be at the service of the goals that the
Commission pursues, and the solutions sought should serve to enhance
the ability of the Commission to achieve those goals. Any discussion on
restructuring the proceedings should consider the impact of the different
measures on those goals.377
As a consequence, the range of possible solutions that the
Commission could implement is limited.378 For instance, the goal of
protecting victims and legitimizing actors in the handling of individual
complaints requires open access to as many individuals as possible,
particularly those marginalized and harassed.379 A move to a more
automated and web-based system could not be fully adopted if it
imperils the right of access to the Commission by individuals without
access to computers or the Internet, as is the case in many areas in the
region.380 Also, measures intended to reduce the backlog by raising the
admissibility bar, making it more difficult to file complaints with the

374. See Antonio Ferreira Braga, Brazil, Admissibility and Merits, Case 12.019, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 35/08 (2008). In this case, the Commission dealt with the torture by
the Police against Mr. Ferreira Braga that took place in 1993. The Commission decided the case
15 years after the torture took place. Surely, by that time, the Governor of the State was not the
same, the police Chief may have retired, the police officers probably moved up through the ranks,
Mr. Ferreira did not get any redress and, more concerning, many other people probably suffered
the same types of torture.
375. Shany, supra note 321, at 237.
376. Id. at 237.
377. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 65.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
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IACHR, or creating a certiorari type of filter,381 would run against those
goals of the Commission.382
The process itself, rather than its outcome, is an essential
component of the functioning and effectiveness of the Commission. Just
initiating a case can serve important short-term goals, such as bringing
attention to an underlying problem, issue, or violation; beginning to
identify and stigmatize those violations and the State responsibility for
them; focusing the international community attention; and validating the
suffering of the victims.383 For purposes such as serving as an early
warning, the opening of a case, and the holding of a hearing, the issuing
of a press release rather than the final disposition of the case could help
raise awareness about the particular issue, victim or violation384.
As a space for dialogue and for human rights advocacy, the
processing of cases itself, rather than the outcome, is essential. Thus, in
certain circumstances, the speedy resolution of cases could hamper this
space. For instance, if those responsible for an alleged violation still
hold power, State cooperation and willingness to discuss human rights
issues may not be forthcoming until those officials are out of power. A
long, drawn out process that keeps a case open could encourage
international condemnation, pressure the government officials involved
to leave office, and facilitate future cooperation with new
governments.385
Alternatively, a slow, selective, and frustrating process also
hampers the credibility and legitimacy of the Commission. Years of
inactivity, repetitive steps, and uncertainty lead to frustration and
disengagement from States and NGOs alike. While a flexible and timeconsuming process helps the Commission in certain circumstances to
381. See Cesar Gaviria, Secretariat for Legal Affairs, Organization of American States,
Document Presented at the General Assembly Session: Toward a New Vision of the InterAmerican Human Rights System (Nov. 3, 1997) (available at CP/doc.2828/96).
382. Ariel Dulitzky, Viviana Krsticevic and Alejandro Valencia Villa, “Una Visión NoGubernamental del Proceso de Reforma del Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos,” 4
THE JOURNAL OF LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS 38, 41 (1996), available at
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/adulitzky/43-Non-Govt-Perspective-esp.pdf .
383. Whiting, supra note 25, at 328.
384. For example, the press release and its annex issued by the Commission at the end of its
143rd. Session where the Commission highlights the situation of women, indigenous peoples and
children among others based on the information received during hearings. Press Release, InterAm. Comm’n H.R., IACHR Brings its 143rd Regular Session to a Close (Nov. 4, 2011),
available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2011/117.asp.
385. For instance, after the reestablishment of the democratic government in Peru in 2000, the
new Government offered “solutions to a significant number of cases” that were pending with the
IACHR. See Joint Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Meeting with Representatives of the
Government
of
Peru
(Feb.
22,
2001)
available
at
http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/English/2001/Peru.htm.
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promote some of its goals, there is a point where the lethargic pace of
adjudication impacts the overall effectiveness of the IACHR. Delays
diminish the deterrent value of processing cases, undermine the quality
of evidence, allow the perpetrators to continue living in impunity,
discourage and marginalize victims, and lead to a squandering of the
international community’s interest in such cases.386
In sum, the Commission has multiple goals in the promotion and
protection of human rights. These goals sometimes contradict each
other. The Commission must strike the appropriate balance between the
speedy resolution of human rights claims and making sure that States
redress victims. In doing so, it may sometimes have to sacrifice the goal
of a speedy process in order to achieve other goals. The architecture of
its case system needs to reflect those tensions and be flexible enough to
accommodate them. Finally, the process is as relevant as its outcome
represented by the final decision of the Commission. In the next section,
I make recommendations to the Commission with those tensions in
mind.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION
Based on our study and experience, and considering our vision of
the Commission’s goals, there are several recommendations to make.
Most of the changes outlined here require only modifications in
practices or in the Rules of Procedure. Thus, most of the
recommendations (with the exception of the financial resources) are
under the control of the Commission and could be implemented by the
Commission itself. I purposely avoided making any recommendations
that would require amending the Convention or the Statute which
involve State participation and consent.387 Nevertheless, in several
publications, I have advocated for a more radical change that would
amend the American Convention to clearly establish a division of duties
between the Commission and Court in processing individual
complaints.388 In that sense, this section should be read as only one

386. Whiting, supra note 25, at 326. In fact, one may wonder how the years of delay end up
shaping the Inter-American docket. It seems that the only actors who would be interested in using
such a system are well-established civil society players who have long-term strategies.
Individuals and NGOs who have a shorter time horizons will avoid the Inter-American system, or
pursue only precautionary measures, or delegate the whole litigation process to those more
established NGOs. As such, delays contribute to the type of actors who actively interact with the
Commission and the type of strategies that they pursue. I thank Alex Huneeus for this
observation.
387. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 76; Commission Statute, supra note 50, art. 22.
388. I propose a fundamental change in the IACHR’s profile through the modification of its
participation in the individual petition system. The Commission should only act as an organ of
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component of a multi-dimensional, long-term reform of the InterAmerican System. Finally most of the recommendations do not require
additional funds.
The OAS is the main party responsible for the current situation as
the Commission is underfunded and understaffed.389 The OAS should
allocate more resources to help the Commission reverse the increasing
backlogs and delays. I believe that 25% of the OAS budget should be
allocated to the Commission and the Court.390 As long as member states
do not properly fund the Commission, they will continue to be the main
parties responsible for the current backlog and delay. Providing the
necessary funds avoids conflicts of interest for donating member and
observer states, and is, simultaneously, more sustainable in the long
run.391 The Commission has launched fundraising campaigns that
involve targeted goals aimed at specific functions of the Commission.392
The Commission’s approach to fundraising should continue to focus on
the publicized goals including the reduction of its backlog. Some
observers have said that if no additional funds are provided, the
Commission faces a potential collapse.393
While an increase in funding and human resources would enable
the Commission to address more petitions and cases in a timely manner,
it is not the solution to all of the challenges faced by the Commission.
The IACHR may make several changes that do not require additional
funding. Those changes would enable the Commission to reallocate its
existing resources more efficiently, and consequently, would increase its
overall effectiveness.

admissibility and facilitator of friendly solutions, and the Court as a tribunal that carries out
findings of fact and makes legal determinations on the merits of complaints. See, e.g., Dulitzky,
Fifty Years, supra note 1, at 128; Ariel Dulitzky, La OEA y los Derechos Humanos: nuevos
perfiles para el Sistema Interamericano, 4 DIÁLOGO POLÍTICO 69–108 (Konrad-Adenauer
Stiftung, 2008); Ariel Dulitzky, Reflexiones sobre la judicialización interamericana y propuesta
de nuevos perfiles para el amparo interamericano, LA REFORMA DEL PROCESO DE AMPARO: LA
EXPERIENCIA COMPARADA, 327 (Samuel B. Abad Yuparqui & Pablo Pérez Tremps eds.,
Palestra, 2009) [hereinafter Dulitzky, Reflexiones].
389. See supra Section VI.
390. See Dulitzky, Reflexiones, supra note 388.
391. See Cavallaro, supra note 261, at 783.
392. Budget of the Strategic Plan, supra note 7, at i.
393. Maria Claudia Pulido, Los Desafíos Presupuestarios y Financieros de la Comisión
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos de la OEA,16 DUE PROCESS OF LAW FOUNDATION, 59, 61
(2012).
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A. Structure of the Proceedings
1. Combined Commission Decision
The Commission should amend its Rules and combine the
admissibility and merits decisions into one.394 Our data suggests that the
separation of the admissibility and merits decisions did not bring more
clarity to admissibility requirements and actually slowed, rather than
quickened, the pace of adjudication.395 The implementation of this
recommendation, above all others, would notably reduce the backlog
and delay.396 The experience of the Court, combining its preliminary
objections, merits and reparations stages, suggest that this change will
be effective in speeding up the process and reducing backlog and
duplication.397 Many States and other actors may object to this
change.398 In fact, the OAS recommended exactly the opposite, asking
the Commission to define objective criteria for the combining of the
admissibility and merits stages.399 However, the Commission’s
credibility and legitimacy has been developed—and continues to be
built—on its determination to create a system responsive to the needs of

394. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 101.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. See OAS Results, supra note 303, at 10 (indicating that in practice deferring the
treatment of admissibility until consideration of the merits “substantially affects due process” and
“restricts the process of seeking a friendly settlement”).
399. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 101. The Commission did so in its recent
reforms to its Rules. Revised Article 36. 3 states:
In exceptional circumstances, and after having requested information from
the parties in accordance with the provisions of Article 30 of these Rules of
Procedure, the Commission may open a case but defer its treatment of
admissibility until the debate and decision on the merits. The decision shall
be adopted by a reasoned resolution of the Commission, which will include
an analysis of those exceptional circumstances. The exceptional
circumstances that the Commission shall take into account will include the
following:
a. when the consideration of the applicability of a possible
exception to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic
remedies would be inextricably tied to the merits of the matter;
b. in cases of seriousness and urgency, or when the Commission
considers that the life or personal integrity of a person may be
in imminent danger; or
c. when the passage of time may prevent the useful effect of the
decision by the Commission.
Draft Reform of Rules, supra note 298, art.36.3.
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the victims.400 One of the main demands of the victims is to have their
complaints fully decided in a timely manner.401
2. Addressing Structural Issues
The Commission should consider using pilot decisions similar to
the pilot judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.402 Pilot
decisions would be applicable to cases that are virtually the same with
respect to the structural problems underlying them.403 This method will
be most effective if the Commission implements a procedure so that
once a decision is made, all pending cases involving the same issue are
noted and immediately resolved using the per curiam decision.404 The
modifications to the Rules would create a procedure that operates when
the Commission receives a significant number of petitions deriving
from the same root cause.405 In those situations, the Commission may
decide to select one or more of them for priority treatment. In dealing
with the selected petition/case or petitions/cases, it will seek to achieve
a solution that extends beyond the particular petition/case so as to cover
all similar cases.406 While Article 29.1.d of the Rules allows for joining
petitions that are in the same stage, it does not allow the Commission to
deal with petitions and cases at different stages.407 It also does not
400. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 101.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 103.
403. In Europe, once the systematic nature of a case is identified, all other cases dealing with
the same issue are put on hold. See THE RIGHT HONORABLE LORD WOOLF ET AL., REVIEW OF
THE WORKING METHODS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 39 (2005), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2005_Lord_Woolf_working_methods_ENG.pdf. That one
case is litigated, and the subsequent decision, the “pilot judgment,” aims for the State in question
to address the systematic problem at the national level for all those concerned. Thus, all
subsequent cases are encapsulated within the “pilot judgment.” Id. The first European Court pilotjudgment procedure—concerning the so-called Bug River cases from Poland (Broniowski v.
Poland (No. 31443/96), 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. and Broniowski v. Poland (Friendly Settlement),
2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R.) was taken to a successful conclusion since new legislation was introduced
and the pending cases were settled. See, e.g., Kachel v. Poland (No. 22930/05), 2008-IV Eur. Ct.
H.R. See also E.G. v. Poland and 175 Other Bug River Applications (No. 50425/99), 1008-IV
Eur.
Ct.
H.R.,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00188774#{"itemid":["001-88774"]}. See also Comm. of Ministers (EC), Res(2004)3 of 12 May
2004 (on judgments revealing an underlying systemic problem). The pilot judgments have saved
the European Court an enormous amount of time and labor and had helped to publicize its
determination to find comprehensive solutions to systemic human rights problems. Helfer, supra
note 22, at 148.
404. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 103.
405. Id. at 104.
406. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 103−04. For a similar proposal see Ramos,
supra note 24, at 175.
407. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 104.
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provide for a clear mechanism establishing the effect of one decision on
cases and petitions dealing with the same pattern of conduct.408
The Commission may also want to consider the option of
“adjourning or ‘freezing’ the examination of all other related cases for a
period of time.”409 If the Commission adopts this model, it must set
certain conditions. First, it should limit the “freeze” to a set period of
time or end the “freeze” if the State fails to show good faith efforts.410
Second, it needs to confirm that the cases selected are truly legally and
factually representative of the group and underlying systemic
problems.411 Third, it should require the State to act promptly on the
recommendations in the pilot decision.412 Fourth, it should continually
keep petitioners in all cases informed about the ongoing procedure.413
Fifth, the Commission needs to include in its recommendations or
mandate that the potential friendly settlement ensures solutions to all
similarly-situated victims and is appropriate to remedy the systemic
human rights issues it has adjudicated.414 The Commission should
emphasize that it may resume examination of “frozen” cases at any time
if the State fails to comply with the structural recommendations.415 Pilot
decisions function only if States comply with the decisions rendered in
the pilot case. As the level of compliance with the Commission’s
decisions is quite low, the utility of pilot decisions should be carefully
analyzed. The Commission should include these pertinent provisions in
its Rules. The use of pilot decisions should not be mandatory and

408. Id.
409. EUR. CT. H.R., THE PILOT-JUDGMENT PROCEDURE: INFORMATION NOTE ISSUED BY THE
REGISTRAR 5 (2009), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DF4E8456-77B3-4E678944-B908143A7E2C/0/Information_Note_on_the_PJP_for_Website.pdf.
410. See id.
411. See id. at 1.
412. See id.
413. See id.
414. See Helfer supra note 22, at 154.
415. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 104. This appears to be the situation with the
case of the dozens of petitions related to the process of confirmation of judges and prosecutors
made by the Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura [National Judicial Council] (CNM) in Peru.
The Commission had “called upon the State to find a comprehensive solution to the problem of
judges not reconfirmed by the National Council of the Magistracy, and to request the State to
submit to the Commission, within a period of one month counted from the date of notification of
the instant report, a proposed comprehensive solution to the situation of all the prosecutors and
magistrates who were not reconfirmed.” See Romeo Edgardo Vargas Romero, Petition No. 49404,
Inter-Am.
Comm'n
H.R.,
Report
No.
20/08
(2008),
available
at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2008eng/Peru494.04eng.htm. The absence of a pilot judgment
mechanism, the Commission’s reluctance to proceed with the accumulation of all the petitions,
the reticent attitude of some petitioners, and Peru’s lack of implementation of an integral remedy
forced the Commission to spend time adopting at least six friendly settlement reports. See Reports
Nos.
107/05,
50/06,
109/06,
20/07,
20/08
and
22/11,
available
at
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/friendly.asp,
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instead, should provide the Commission enough flexibility to decide
when it is pertinent to apply that procedure and when the use of pilot
decisions should not lead to an adjournment of cases. In order to create
an incentive for the State to resolve the problem, the Rules need to
establish a fast-track procedure for those “unfrozen” cases and provide a
stronger presumption that all these “unfrozen” cases will be filed with
the Court immediately (given that the State accepts the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal).416
3. Petitions Intake System
The Commission should reform the way it receives and registers
petitions.417 Specifically, the Commission should take steps to increase
the number of petitions submitted online and reduce the number of
unacceptable petitions.418 The online form should preclude the
possibility of filing incomplete petitions. The Commission should also
publish the Rules within the online petition system, with an explanatory
note drafted in a more user-friendly manner, showing examples of
petitions that are clearly unacceptable.419 By being very explicit with
these standards and examples, and transmitting them in a very
simplified and user-friendly manner, the number of unacceptable
petitions will be reduced and the transparency of the Commission’s
standards increased.420
4. Continued Use of Archiving Decisions
The Commission should continue using archival decisions to
eliminate inactive petitions and cases from its docket.421 Nevertheless,
archival decisions “should not depend automatically on procedural
inactivity with respect to a petition, given that such a situation might

416.
417.
418.
419.

MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 104.
Id. at 100.
Id.
Id. See also, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STRENGTHENING THE
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODY SYSTEM DUBLIN II MEETING OUTCOME
DOCUMENT, 86 (2011) [hereinafter Dublin II]. Treaty bodies should give increased visibility to
individual communications procedures, including the admissibility requirements, to facilitate their
more effective use by individuals. Id. at 101 (The Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights should develop and disseminate enhanced guidelines on submission of individual
communications in order to assist towards the improvement of quality of submissions and reduce
the number of inadmissible or manifestly ill-founded cases submitted to treaty bodies.).
420. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 100.
421. See OAS Results, supra note 303, at 11.
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arise because of delay by the Commission in processing the petition or
for other reasons that have nothing to do with inaction on the part of the
petitioner.”422 The IACHR needs to keep in mind that a number of
inactive cases are not necessarily inactive owing to absence of action on
the part of the petitioner, but rather a delay on the part of the
Commission. The delay should not operate automatically to the
detriment of the victim or petitioner. As many petitioners or victims
relocate for purposes of personal safety or due to worsening economics,
the IACHR should proceed only when effective notice has been given to
the petitioner, or when all reasonable steps have been taken to locate the
petitioner. Also, as archiving is contingent on the filing of additional
information, and as many victims and petitioners belong to communities
traditionally excluded from legal protections, or which do not have the
resources to do the documentation work requested by the Commission,
the response time allotted should be appropriate.423
5. Friendly Settlement
The Commission should continue to make friendly settlement a
high priority in its mission. The recently created specialized Friendly
Settlement Group is an important first step. The Friendly Settlement
Group should identify cases that are more likely to settle and encourage
States and petitioners to attend mediation sessions and find a resolution
to the situation.424
The Rules of Procedure allow the Commission to make itself
available to parties at any point during the processing of a case.425 The
Friendly Settlement Group should take advantage of this prerogative at
the beginning stages of the processing of a petition, such as after the
initial review when the Commission first requests observations from the
State.426
Friendly settlement can also be a tool that addresses structural
problems or recurring issues. The Commission should encourage
friendly settlement to dispose of groups of similar cases.427 If a
petitioner refuses to agree to a settlement that all other petitioners in the
group agree on, publishing a report and not referring the case to the
Court could be a remedy to those who did not settle.428 The Commission

422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.

Coalition Observations, supra note 338, at 11.
CEJIL Observations, supra note 137, at 11−12.
See MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 105−06.
See Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 40.1.
See MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 106.
Id.
Id.
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may need to have a presumption that where there are holdouts to group
settlements—i.e. one or two petitioners do not agree to the settlement,
but a large number of petitioners do agree—the unsettled petitions will
not be referred to the Court.429 The Commission would have to decide
what ratio of holdouts to petitioners in agreement is necessary for such a
presumption when writing the rule. Further, the rule would only involve
a presumption that the case should not be referred to the Court. That
way, if the petitioner had a strong reason for not agreeing to the
settlement, the Commission could still consider the option to ignore the
presumption and refer the case to the Court.430 The experience of class
action settlements and the regulations related to objectors in the United
States could provide guidance in this area.431
It is crucial that new rules specify the effects of noncompliance
with friendly settlement.432 Currently, once the Commission adopts a
report approving a friendly settlement, there is no possibility to continue
with the petition or case even if the State does not comply with the
agreement. This situation may cause petitioners to refuse to sign
agreements because of the possibility of State noncompliance.433 The
Rules need to provide for the re-opening of a case after a prudential
amount of time has elapsed and if no substantial compliance exists.434
The IACHR should conduct more working visits to States and
should emphasize friendly settlement in those visits. Commissioners can
hold or facilitate mediation sessions during the working visits to resolve
issues between petitioners and the State.435

429.
430.
431.
432.

Id.
Id.
Id.
HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF TEXAS SCH. OF LAW, MAXIMIZING JUSTICE,
MINIMIZING DELAY: STREAMLINING PROCEDURES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
106
(2011),
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_Justice_Minimizing_Delay_at
_the_IACHR.pdf
433. Id.
434. Id. The Commission may look at Article 37, Section 2 of the European Convention that
allows the European Court to restore an application to its list of cases if it considers that the
circumstances justify such a course. See, e.g., Katić v. Serbia, App. No. 13920/04, 2010-II Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1 (2010) (reinstating a case after failure to comply with the terms of a friendly settlement
agreement).
435. Id. This proposal may require additional funds.
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6. Follow-up Measures
Article 48.1 of the Rules should be amended to make the adoption
of follow-up measures mandatory and not discretionary.436 The
Commission should follow-up actively and more closely on cases by
making detailed assessments on the status of each recommendation. In
order to facilitate implementation and secure proper follow-up, the
Commission should avoid vague language that merely indicates that
States should “adopt necessary measures.”437 The Commission should
specify as much as possible what sorts of measures would be
sufficient.438 Additionally, the IACHR should create, and make public,
clear criteria to evaluate whether, and to what degree, a
recommendation has been complied with. In its review of the status of
compliance with its decisions, the Commission should provide clearer
information explaining what constitutes full and partial compliance.439
There is a clear correlation between full implementation of the
decisions and reduction of the backlog. If States follow the
Commission’s recommendations in individual cases, there will be a
positive impact in similar cases. First, future violations could be
prevented.440 And for similar violations that already took place, those
similar cases could be solved by friendly settlements, shorter reports;
even withdrawal from the case docket of the Commission or avoidance
of its filing altogether.
Working visits are particularly appropriate to conduct follow-up
measures. Thus, the Commission should conduct more targeted country
visits. The agenda of these visits should include meetings with
petitioners and the Government to discuss the measures taken to comply
with the Commission’s and Court’s decisions, and with State officers
with decision-making power and responsibility to implement key
recommendations and decisions. Before these visits, the Commission
should issue a public statement indicating the status of each case to be
436. Id. at 107.
437. See, e.g., Basch, supra note 137, at 32.
438. See OAS Results, supra note 303, at 13. See also Dublin II, supra note 419, at ¶ 93
(discussing the UN treaty body system). “Remedies should, to the greatest extent possible, be
framed in a way that allows their implementation to be measured. Treaty bodies should use
targeted and focused remedial language and, where possible, be prescriptive . . . Proposed
remedies should be structured around short- and long-term goals, specifying concrete steps to be
taken by States.” Id.
439. The same recommendation has been put forth regarding the Court’s decisions. See
Basch, supra note 137, at 32.
440. In fact, the Commission routinely recommends States to “adopt all necessary measures
to prevent the recurrence of similar acts, in accordance with the responsibility to prevent and to
guarantee the fundamental rights recognized in the American Convention.” See Martín Pelicó
Coxic, Case 11.658, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 80/07 (2007).
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discussed with the parties. At the end of the visit, the IACHR should
issue another press statement indicating the commitments assumed by
the States to implement the recommendations, if any.441
During each visit, the Commission should bring to the attention of
the authorities not only those cases with merits decisions, friendly
settlement or court judgments, but also other similar pending cases to
address structural problems.
B. Management of the Procedure
1. Reduction of Duplication
The Commission has taken steps to eliminate duplicative steps in
its process. These are small changes, but over the course of a day or a
week, they add up. The less time spent on duplicative matters, the more
time the Commission can spend on processing cases. For instance, only
recently are States no longer notified by duplicate methods. It was not
until mid-2011 that the IACHR started to notify States by just one
method—since mid-2011, petitioners are notified by email or other
methods only in the absence of email.442
2. New simplified format for admissibility reports
If the Commission does not adopt our recommendation to unify the
admissibility and merits stages, the admissibility reports should be
adopted in a simplified manner.443 The only topic that the Commission
needs to address in each report is the one that the State contests in an
explicit manner. If the State does not challenge any admissibility issue,
the Commission should defer its treatment to the merits stage.444
441. See MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 108. Again, these additional visits may
require additional funds.
442. Id. at 100.
443. See Ramos, supra note 24, at 173 (proposing that “the admissibility approach should be
more concise, like that of the European’s human rights system and operate as a checklist, rather
than a long description and legal analysis of the facts”).
444. The European Court also uses simplified summary decisions on established matters of
law. The new Article 28(1)(b) of the European Convention empowers judges to rule, in a
simplified summary procedure, not only on the admissibility, but also on the merits of an
application, if the underlying question “is already the subject of well-established case-law of the
Court.” European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, June 1, 2010, C.E.T.S. 194, art. 28(1)(b). “This applies, in
particular, to cases where an application is one of a series deriving from the same systemic defect
at the national level; hence, a repetitive case.” Patricia Egli, Protocol No. 14 To The European
Convention For The Protection Of Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms: Towards A More
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3. Adoption of Admissibility Decisions and Preliminary Revision
of Merits Reports by a Working Group
If the Commission does not implement the recommendation to
combine the admissibility and merits decisions, or even until such
change comes into force, it should adopt admissibility reports through a
working group composed of four members445 rather than by the plenary
of the Commission. The plenary should, instead, focus on discussing
merits decisions.446 The admissibility decisions could be adopted during
the sessions or virtually when the Commission is not in session, leaving
even more time for merits decisions during sessions.447 The other three
Commissioners not participating in the admissibility discussion should
form another working group to do an initial review of the merits reports
in order to speed up their discussion in plenary. These changes would
shift the Commission’s attention during session to merits decisions.448
4. Commission’s Use of Per Curiam Decisions
The Commission has used the per curiam tool in cases such as
Fierro449 and Thomas.450 “Recently, the Commission made an explicit
reference to ‘the practice of adopting per curiam decisions’ and
declared two petitions inadmissible just in one paragraph, by referring
to a previously decided petition.”451 The Commission should continue
its practice of using simplified per curiam decisions.452

Effective Control Mechanism?, 17 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 13 (2007).
445. According to Article 17 of the Statute of the Commission, an absolute majority, four
members, constitutes quorum. Commission Statute, supra note 50.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 102. See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Resolution
Establishing a Working Group on Communications and Appointment of Members
ACHPR/Res.194 (L), available at http://www.achpr.org/sessions/50th/resolutions/194/
(establishing a Working Group on Communications to meet twice a year during the intersession,
and which may also meet prior to the Sessions of the African Commission).
449. César Fierro v. U.S., Case 11.331, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 99/03
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2 ¶ 37 (2003) (the Commission recalled a previous decision and
decided to “adopt . . . for the purposes of this report its findings in the [previous case] and . . .
analyze Mr. Fierro’s circumstances in light of those findings”).
450. Douglas Christopher Thomas v. U.S., Case 12.240, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
100/03, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.118, doc. 5 rev.2 ¶¶ 39−41 (2003).
451. Soc. Sec. Contributions of Retired and Civil Servants - Physicians Union of the Fed.
Dist. v. Brazil, Petition 989-04, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 133/09 ¶ 21 (2009)
available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2009eng/Brazil989.04eng.htm. See also, Social
Security Contributions of Retired and Pensioned Civil Servants - UNAFISCO, CONAMP, et al.
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The Rules should be amended to explicitly allow the Commission
to issue per curiam decisions in cases that are substantially similar to
cases that have previously been decided. Per curiam decisions would
point to the past cases and merely declare that the facts and legal issues
are the same, so that the petition or case is decided in the same manner
as the previous decision. The Commission should articulate criteria on
which per curiam decisions can be based and should make those criteria
and the process of identifying similar cases fully transparent.453
5. Receipt of Information and Documents
The Rules should be revised to require the parties to present their
evidence and documents at the earlier stages of the process. The
Commission should follow the Court’s Rules of Procedure that require
the parties to submit all offered evidence in their initial submissions.454
Article 57 of the Court Rules provide only very limited exceptions−for
example, only when the evidence was omitted “due to force majeure or
serious impediment” or it “refers to an event which occurred after the
procedural moments indicated.”455
Such a rule would encourage the parties to present all of their
evidence early in the process, and allow the Commission to begin
deliberations sooner, as well as allow both parties to see the strengths
and weaknesses of their petitions and cases and to determine the
desirability of a friendly settlement. This change can be implemented
without sacrificing the fact-finding ability of the Commission and
cooperation by States and petitioners if the rule is transparent and
emphasized to the parties ahead of time. Of course, in order to be
effective, a strict deadline for the receipt of evidence and information
needs to be accompanied by a speeding up of the rest of the process.
6. Consistent Application of the Rules to Speed Up the Process
The Commission should be much more proactive in applying the
procedural tools at its disposal to reduce the length of its procedure.456
The Commission should more frequently apply all the Rules that allow
v. Brazil, Petitions 1133/04 and 115-05, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 134/09 ¶ 23 (2009)
available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2009eng/Brazil1133.04eng.htm.
452. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 103.
453. Id.
454. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, arts. 35.1, 36.1, 40.2, 41.1.
455. Id. art. 57.
456. Id. at 101.
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it to speed up the process, particularly Article 36.4 that allows the
Commission to join the admissibility and merits decisions in
exceptional circumstances. Article 36.4 has enormous potential to help
the Commission to reduce its backlog and speed up the process.457 So
far, the Commission has applied the rule inconsistently, and mainly in
death penalty cases.458 In the past, the Commission used to apply Article
36.4 in all petitions opened before the 2000 amendments, and which had
been in the Commission for at least five years.459 Furthermore, the
IACHR joined admissibility and merits decisions when the State did not
respond to a petition. Apparently, these practices have been abandoned
in recent years. When declining to use a procedural resource like the
rule in Article 36.4, the Commission should state clearly why it chose to
forego this time saving route.
Additionally the Commission should be much more explicit in
explaining the different uses of procedural rules for similar cases or
petitions. The 2013 revisions of the Rules make explicit criteria for
joining the admissibility and merits stages. The IACHR should
explicitly expand the justifications for joining the admissibility and
merits phases to include reasons such as the length of time a petition is
in the Commission’s docket, and the situation of the victim or
procedural economy.460
Article 29.d should also be more consistently used in order to
accumulate petitions when two or more complaints address similar
facts, involve the same persons, or reveal the same pattern of conduct.461
So far, the possibility of accumulating petitions has not been
systematically applied by the Commission.462 The IACHR needs to
continuously revise its docket in order to determine the potential
application of this article as soon as possible.
If the Convention, the Statute or the Rules establishes specific
deadlines for the Commission to take certain action, the IACHR should
be very careful when the Commission does not follow those time
stipulations.463 If the Commission does not comply with those deadlines,
explicit, clear and careful explanations should be made publicly.

457. Coalition Observations, supra note 338, at 11 (underscoring “the importance that this
mechanism may have for expediting the proceedings by making processing by the IACHR more
efficient, without jeopardizing the right to defense and procedural due process”).
458. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 101.
459. CEJIL Observations, supra note 137, at 9.
460. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 101.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. E.g., American Convention, supra note 7, art. 51 (establishing that the Commission
needs to refer the case to the Court within three months from the approval of the preliminary
report); Commission Statute, supra note 50, art. 23.2 (requiring the Commission to adopt a merits
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Finally, while preserving the necessary flexibility of its procedure,
the Commission needs to be stricter in the application of its deadlines
and in granting extensions. Articles 30.4 and 37.2 require that any
request for extensions to be “duly founded.”464 The Secretariat should
make clear assessment of the reasons for granting extensions. As Article
30.4 refers only to requests for extensions made by the States, the
Commission needs to amend its Rules and practices to extend the
requirement of duly founded requests to include those formulated by
petitioners. In its reports the Commission needs to include the reasons
for granting such extensions. The Rules should be amended to clarify
the consequences of missing deadlines to the parties. Beyond the
instances expressly mandated in the Rules of Procedure, the IACHR
should reduce its requests to the parties for observations to an absolute
minimum.465
7. Transparency and data
In the last fifteen years, the IACHR has adopted several initiatives
that provide more information on its work and clear criteria for the type
of decisions that it adopts.466 Nevertheless, greater transparency is
required for a more effective and efficient Commission in dealing with
its backlog and delays. For example, the Clinic asked the Commission
how many cases were awaiting Articles 50 and 51 reports. The
Commission’s response was simply to say that the “Commission does
not currently gather the statistics requested.”467
The Commission can increase support from all the involved actors
if it publicizes more information. Examples of useful information
includes information on the way it handles cases and petitions, their
status, and when the Commission disposes them. The IACHR has
consistently insisted that States should produce more data on a variety
of issues. The IACHR considers “data systems [to be] essential in order to
be able to analyze possible causes and trends and to evaluate the

report within 180 days if a friendly settlement fails).
464. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 102.
465. Id.
466. For instance, the Commission started to publish information on the precautionary
measures that it adopted in 1997 and on the statistics on the case system in 1998. See Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., IACHR Annual Report 1997, OEA/Ser.L/V/III.39 doc.5, at ch. III.2.A, available
at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/97eng/chap.3.htm#_ftn4; Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., IACHR
Annual Report 1999, OEA/Ser.L/V/III.47 doc.6, at ch. III.B, available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/Chapter3.htm#2.
467. Commission’s Answers, supra 58, at 16.
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468

response[s].” I believe that those same conclusions and recommendations
are applicable to the Commission’s own information on the processing of
petitions and cases. Making more information available to the public will
increase both support and public accountability.
The Commission could learn from the United States Citizenship
and Immigration Service (USCIS) website and the sheer amount of
information available to the public on it.469 The IACHR could publish
more statistical information such as a backlog tracker, the type of claim
of each petition and case, the timeline of the cases and petitions, the
status of cases and petitions divided by country and stage of the
procedure, number of cases and petitions in friendly settlement
468. OAS, INTER-AMERICAN COMM’N H.R., ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR WOMEN VICTIMS OF
VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS, OAS/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 68 rev. ¶ 181 (2007). The IACHR also
recommended States to:
[c]reate and improve systems for recording statistical and qualitative data[;]
...
[s]trengthen data records on cases . . . to ensure that they are uniform, reliable
and transparent[;]
...
[i]mplement measures so that the data systems more adequately reflect the
situation[;] . . . [t]ake measures so that data systems are able to disaggregate
the data by sex, age, race, ethnic origin, and other variables[;] . . . [k]eep
reliable, up-to-date statistics[;]
...
[i]nstitutionalize means and methods to share information within a diversity
of sectors –centers and state entities that deal with this topic, the victims,
their communities, the private sector, academia, international organizations
and civil society organizations- and facilitate collaboration and circulation of
information between producers and users[;] . . . [and u]ndertake efforts and
initiatives to get the available information to the general public in a format
that is responsive to the needs of a variety of audiences and populations of
differing economic and educational levels, different cultures and different
languages. The safety and privacy of the victims should be paramount in this
reporting process.
Id. at 120−21.
469. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Service’s (USCIS) use of technology to
bolster transparency, and its similarity to the Commission as a quasi-judicial body, makes it an
appropriate comparative study. The Commission could learn from the 2009 USCIS redesigned
website and the amount of information available to the public on it. The website
(https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/Dashboard.do) provides applicants and their attorneys with
information about case status (e.g. where in the process their case is at). Once a petitioner enters
in her case number, she will see a dot highlighted over which part of the process her case is at.
There is also a summary of each stage of the adjudication process, so that the petitioner can know
what to expect. From here, she can also see how long she might expect before her case is fully
adjudicated with a decision. The USCIS website gives detailed instructions when downloading an
application form on how to fill out the form, what type of evidence should be submitted, and what
kinds of cases “win,” versus what types “lose,” so as to ensure that its public and petitioners are
fully informed. The website (https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/processTimesDisplayInit.do) also
provides information on the average time that it takes for a particular case to be adjudicated by
each individual office.
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negotiations specified by country, number of cases with Article 50
reports approved divided by country, number of petitions not
transmitted by the Secretariat disaggregated by country and reason for
the decision, or data on petitions and cases disaggregated by sex and
gender, ethnicity, and age of the victim(s). Furthermore, the
Commission should publicize its rationale for when it does or does not
apply time saving rules.470
C. Administration and Institutional Culture
1. Performance Management
The Commission has announced plans to create a performance
management scheme for 2011-2015.471 As part of this plan, the IACHR
intends to emphasize consistency in drafting reports, and will create
methods for staff to use their time efficiently and effectively.472 The
Registry’s performance management scheme can serve as a model for
performance management throughout the Commission. For example,
the Commission stated that the average time for review of a new
petition is twenty-five months.473 The Commission should develop an
internal consensus on what constitutes a reasonable time for processing
a petition or case so that standards can be developed for determining
whether its effort to combat delay is progressing.474 The establishment
of indicative timeframes must not be construed as a “sunset clause,”
requiring that a petition or case be dismissed as a consequence of
missing the target timeframe. Such an approach would not only harm
the victims who do not control the pace of adjudication, but it would
mainly benefit the States—which do not provide the Commission with
the necessary funds to process petitions and cases more expeditiously in
the first place.475 Also, the Commission needs to attend to the unique
needs of each case and petition, since the reasonability of one case or
petition is not automatically reasonable in another. In other words, the
reasonableness standard should be indicative of the expected timeframe,

470. See OAS Working Group, supra note 15, at 12; MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at
107.
471. STRATEGIC PLAN PART II, supra note 162, at 4−5.
472. Id.
473. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 96.
474. Id. See also OAS Working Group, supra note 15, at 12 (recommending the Commission
to adopt at least an indicative timeframe for each of the stages of the procedure).
475. Coalition Observations, supra note 338, at 11.

204

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 35:131

but have enough flexibility to accommodate the needs of a particular
petition or case.
The Commission should also measure the performance of each of
the four regional groups and make the results public. The Commission
can use performance measurement and management to determine where
it needs to add more resources, help its staff understand their goals, and
learn more about its own strengths and weaknesses.476 The lawyers of
the Commission can also understand their own practices better.
Moreover, the IACHR can examine the practices of particular regional
units that may be more efficient than other units and try to replicate
those practices throughout.
There may be some concern within the Commission that
implementing performance measurement will affect its culture and
goals. However, performance measurement and management is not
always about individual actors or transforming the workplace into a
mechanical environment.477 The use of flexible targets, rather than hardand-fast goals, is an example of the use of performance measurement
and management within the Commission.478 The Registry has shown
that such a system can be effectively integrated with the Commission’s
culture.479 Furthermore, perhaps a change in culture is needed if backlog
and delays are embedded in that culture. In fact, researchers have shown
that changes in case-processing speed require changes in the attitudes
and practices of all members of the community involved in such
systems.480 Researchers have demonstrated that “both speed and backlog
are determined in large part by established expectations, practices, and
informal rules of behavior” of those administering the system and
litigating.481 Those expectations, practices and behaviors were termed
“local legal culture.”482 Since both the adjudicatory bodies and the
litigants have adapted to a given pace of adjudication, these
expectations and practices must be overcome for there to be any
successful attempt to increase the pace of litigation.483
A potential shortcoming to avoid is that the lawyers at the
Commission may be tempted or even required to sacrifice higher quality
to improve their numbers. It is important to note that the Commission
has stated that in order to speed up the process it “will not . . . sacrifice

476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.

MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 97.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Steelman, supra note 162, at 151.
Id. at 153.
Id.
Id.
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the quality of its decisions or deliberation process.”484 The Secretariat
management team and the Commissioners must not let performance
measurements based on numbers diminish the quality of reports. The
Commission’s effectiveness strongly relies on the persuasiveness of its
decisions.485 At the same time, the Commission and its Executive
Secretariat should find the proper balance between an intended goal of
perfection and the need to dispense cases in a timely manner.486
2. Integration of the so-called “Registry” approach
to the Rest of the Commission
The creation and expansion of the “Registry” has significantly
contributed to the System’s efficiency.487 Its model of timemeasurement as well as its targeted goals should be more clearly
incorporated within the Commission. The backlog and the delays do not
affect only new petitions, but rather, they appear throughout the process
of the Commission. For that reason, the Commission should redistribute
the resources allocated to the Registry throughout the Executive
Secretariat and expand the Registry’s methodological approach to the
rest of the areas responsible for processing petitions and cases.488
3. Technology
The Commission should take proactive efforts to embrace and
promote technological changes. The Commission has instituted a
program called PPP that digitizes communications from individual
petitioners and States, so that they may check the status of their matters
via the Internet.489 However, the Commission does not have a program
that digitizes petitions and cases older than 2007.490 Therefore, the
Commission needs to digitally process all petitions and cases still
pending in its docket.
The databases of the IACHR should be made publicly available.
The parties to the petition and cases should be able to track the status of
their petition or case. Parties should also be able to submit additional
information and documents online. In fact, the States had asked the
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.

Position Document, supra note 59, at 13.
See Slaughter & Helfer, supra note 322, at 318.
MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 97.
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id. at 99.
Id.
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Commission to improve mechanisms to enable states, petitioners, and
concerned victims to access records of petitions and cases in electronic
format in order to encourage the prompt solution of said cases.491
Other telecommunication measures should be implemented to
speed up the analysis and discussion of cases and petitions. Meetings of
pre-session or inter-session working groups or the plenary of the
Commission could take place by telephone or videoconference. The
IACHR should also convene hearings via videoconference with the
parties in order to advance friendly settlement negotiations and, when
appropriate, to receive information or testimonies.
IX. CONCLUSION
There are three overarching obstacles that the Commission faces in
its case system: a large backlog of petitions waiting to be dealt with, a
long time period before petitions and cases can be fully resolved, and an
insufficient number of petitions and cases fully resolved with a merits
decision. The Commission’s changes in the 2000 Rules of Procedure
have exacerbated these problems. In splitting the Commission’s
decision into Admissibility and Merits, the rule change added another
step that further delayed the processing of petitions and shifted the
emphasis to the preliminary phases of the procedure.
There are several lessons from the study of the process of the
Commission, its delays, and backlog. The case of the Commission
supports the proposition that a goals-based analysis is necessary in order
to assert the effectiveness of an adjudicatory body. It also demonstrates
that the context in which it operates offers possibilities and constraints
in achieving those goals. The goal-based approach provides tools to
understand how the Commission operates and, in particular, to assess
how its structure, process and outcomes contribute to or undermine its
effectiveness.492 Particularly, the multiplicity of goals that the
Commission pursues challenges the idea that compliance with its
recommendations is the only, or even the main, measure of its
effectiveness.493
Every international human rights system confronts the same
paradox—the States that created the system are at the same time the
subject of control. Although the States may confer a number of powers
on the supervisory organs of the system, States will generally retain
control over its functions among them by selecting the members and

491. See OAS Working Group, supra note 15, at 12; OAS Results, supra note 303.
492. Shany, supra note 321, at 270.
493. Id.
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controlling the funding of the supervisory bodies. States also play the
central role in enforcing their decisions. This paradox creates
institutional and political tensions, which interfere with the work and
effectiveness of these organs.494 The current backlog of the Commission
provides a clear example of this paradox. States do not fund the IACHR
adequately. States do not submit information or evidence in time, do not
participate or agree on enough friendly settlements, and do not comply
with the Commission’s recommendations.
Although human rights are given great importance in the public
resolutions of the OAS, and the strengthening the IACHR is designated
as a priority, the Commission is viewed as a thorn in the side of those
member states that have continuing human rights problems.495 Many
States within the OAS continue to fear the work of the Commission.496
Interestingly, many OAS members see the IACHR as far too effective
and thus try to limit its impact. Many proposals coming from States do
not seem to be constructive but rather attempts to undermine the System
in general and the Commission in particular.497 In this article, I made
several references to recommendations issued by the OAS Working
Group, which was created with the idea of strengthening the
Commission. In fact, that Working Group clearly had, in the view of
many, the intention of diminishing the effectiveness and efficiency of
the Commission.498 Thus, I included only those recommendations that
coincide with those formulated by other actors or that help us
understand the constraints that the Commission faces in dealing with
these issues.
Any attempt to comprehend the functioning of the Commission’s
procedure must therefore take into account the hostile environment in
which it operates. As such, the context in which the Commission
operates supports a goal-based approach to measure its effectiveness as
it demonstrates the constraints that hinder international adjudicatory
bodies in their particular political and institutional environment.499

494. Id.
495. Id.
496. See, e.g., Jorge Rhenán Segura, Las Reformas al Sistema Interamericano de Derechos
Humanos, LI, 113/118 BOLETIN DA SOCIEDADE BRASILEIRA DE DIREITO INT’L 124 (1998).
497. Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System: Progress Made and Still
to be Made 52 GERMAN Y.B. OF INT’L LAW 181, 183 (2009).
498. Victoria Amato, Una Mirada al Proceso de Reflexion Sobre el Funcionamiento de la
Comision Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [A Look at the Process of Reflection on the
Functioning of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights], 16 APORTES DUE PROCESS
LAW FOUND., 4 (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.dplf.org/uploads/1332509827.pdf.
499. Shany, supra note 321, at 261.
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However, not all of the Commission’s problems are attributable to
lack of funding or State support. Not all of the solutions depend upon
finding additional money. An efficient organization is one that uses
what it has to maximize its output. In this sense, the Commission’s
chronic lack of financial and human resources does not justify its
inefficiency. The OAS should of course adequately fund the
Commission and it is the principal party responsible for the current
backlog and delays. Nevertheless, this does not excuse the Commission
from attempting to be as efficient as possible with the limited resources
that it has.
The Commission’s situation also demonstrates how a human rights
body must find a proper balance between efficiency and effectiveness.
This is not an easy task as efficiency and effectiveness are hard to
measure, and adjudicatory bodies tend to have multiple goals that can
and do contradict each other. With respect to the Commission, its
resource constraints and multiplicity of goals mean that the Commission
must make difficult decisions about which tasks to emphasize and how
to balance competing demands. The resource constraints also mean that
efficiency within the Commission is vital to its success. In balancing its
efficiency and effectiveness, the Commission must consider its broader
goals, while also realizing that the growing delays may thwart its ability
to actually address the problems of petitioners.
The pace of adjudication is closely tied to the goals of the
adjudicatory body and expediency does not always contribute to
effectiveness. Time may be required to accommodate the needs of the
victims as they prepare evidence, secure State engagement, and provide
a space for cooperation and fruitful dialogue. At the same time,
excessive delays could hamper the overall effectiveness of the System.
The lack of response to the vast number of petitions by the Commission,
and the delays and inconsistencies in their resolution frustrates the
victims, petitioners and States, and creates distrust in the System. This
often subjects the victims to a process of re-victimization.
Finally, the case of the Commission demonstrates that in
articulating recommendations for an international adjudicatory body, the
international community should have realistic expectations and
understand the value of certain delays and of a flexible process.500 At
the end of the day, the study of the Commission indicates that the
overriding interest of the process and the outcome of such a process is
the fulfillment of its overall goals, not expedience.

500. Whiting, supra note 25, at 360−61.

